AMERICA 

AFTER 
THEW\R 

ByAn 

AMERICAN 

JURIST 




Class 

Book ILf 

GopyrigM? 



COFVRIGHI' DEPOSIT. 



I- 



AMERICA 
AFTER THE WAR 



AMERICA 
AFTER THE WAR 



BY 
AN AMERICAN JURIST 




NEW YORK 

THE CENTURY CO. 

1918 



\ 



\9 



Copyright, 1918, by 
The Centuby Co. 



Copyright, 1918, by 
The New York Times Company 



Published, March, 1918 



APR -4 1918 



©GLA492808 



.'- 



The general interest aroused by the 
communications of An American Jurist 
while the series was in the course of pub- 
lication in the New York Times during 
the month of January is the warrant 
for their reproduction in book form. 

It should be said here that the title, 
"An American Jurist,' ' was not of the 
author's choosing. As the communica- 
tions were published anonymously, it 
was necessary to indicate in some man- 
ner the quality and the authority of the 
writer and they were described in the 
Times as coming from the pen of An 
American Jurist, an ascription of au- 
thority which, while appropriate and ac- 
curate, the author 's modesty might have 
disclaimed. 

March, 1918. 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER 

I America and the War 



II Belgium and Luxemburg . . 22 

III The Balkans 43 

IV The Sequel op the War . . 54 
V Mexico 64 

VI Canada 80 

VII The West Indies 99 

VIII Asia and the Pacific .... 112 

IX America after the War . . .123 

X Democracy 134 

XI An American Merchant Marine 171 

XII Preparedness 186 



PAGE 

3 



p'. 



AMERICA AFTER THE 
WAR 



AMERICA AFTER THE 
WAR 

CHAPTER I 

AMERICA AND THE WAE 

When the national authorities acted, 
and America became a belligerent in one 
of the most stupendous wars in history, 
the duty of Americans to their country 
was clear : they were bound to sustain the 
successful prosecution of the war by 
every legitimate means in their power. 
Nevertheless, without impropriety they 
may continue to differ concerning the 
ends and the ultimate effects of the war 
on the future of the nation and on civi- 
lization in general. The right to free- 
dom of opinion does not, however, abro- 

3 



4 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

gate the duty of an American not to em- 
barrass his Government by useless dis- 
cussion. No further debate, for exam- 
ple, concerning the propriety of a war is 
admissible in any orderly state after 
war is once duly declared. The laws 
which underlie national existence do not 
permit individual or domestic opposition 
to the national authority in time of war ; 
but the liberty postulated of a republic 
does permit a reasonable discussion, in 
the abstract, of the future national prob- 
lems affected by the war. 

All modern wars between nations are 
in the last analysis founded on national 
interest and national honor, which are al- 
most identical terms. Other causes may 
be assigned by political parties, and in 
popular governments other causes are 
often necessarily assigned when the cit- 
izenship is indifferent to the national 
honor or oblivious of the urgency of 



AMERICA AND THE WAR 5 

the paramount national interest. The 
United States had an ample casus belli 
on which to found a declaration of war 
against Germany. The conduct of Ger- 
many prior to 1917 had violated the prin- 
cipal laws of war {jura belli), to the 
great injury of the American nation. 
The wonder is that American politicians 
and even the national authorities so long 
absolutely ignored or tolerated what was 
generally apparent. But underneath all 
the causes avowed for America's en- 
tering the war lay that mainspring of na- 
tional action — the national safety and 
the national interest. Prior to 1914 it 
had long been foreseen by thoughtful 
men that America would sooner or later 
be obliged to enter into a war with Ger- 
many. The present time was certainly 
an opportune time for America to begin 
hostilities that were inevitable. Long 
anterior to the present war Germany was 



6 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

known to regard with invidious eyes this 
hemisphere, its institutions, its preten- 
sions, and its peculiar and phenomenal 
development. It should be confessed 
that America in the past has not been 
most favorably regarded by European 
governments. Between the political 
thought of Europe and the political 
thought of America lies a great abyss 
far deeper than the separating seas. 
Only time can satisfactorily bridge this 
chasm. 

Between Germany and America in 
particular there has long been a latent 
misunderstanding. Since 1870, given 
an opportune moment, American inter- 
ests would have been unhesitatingly as- 
sailed by Germany with all the force 
and power it could command. For this 
reason, if for no other, it was the interest 
of the American Government to meet the 
inevitable issue with Germany at least as 



AMERICA AND THE WAR 7 

soon as it did, and it is its duty to wage 
the war with all the power and force it 
can command. 

Some of the provocative causes ably 
stated by President Wilson in his ad- 
dress to Congress, April 2, 1917, and as- 
signed as reasons for the entrance of 
America into a foreign war, have not 
become of less moment now that America 
is at war. Their indirect purpose was 
the conviction of those Americans who 
think little concerning the laws which 
control the struggles for human and na- 
tional existence. That America was jus- 
tified in her declaration of war for many 
reasons not stated by the President the 
world in the end will concede. Her 
imperiled national interests alone af- 
forded ample justification for such a 
declaration. But in pragmatic England 
and in practical America political and 
national movements are singularly pro- 



8 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

moted by sentimental considerations, 
sometimes pertinent, at others irrele- 
vant, but always skilfully manipulated 
by those more discerning public men 
who have closer at heart the national 
interests and well-being, and who them- 
selves need no other incentive besides 
the national interests for even such an 
extreme action as public war. 

For the honor of humanity it is sad to 
have to admit that sentiment of itself is 
never a valid reason of state for extreme 
national measures. In the minds of 
statesmen of any country sentiment is 
not the real reason for war, though it is 
often made use of by public men in order 
to influence some desired public action. 
Patriotism is not a sentiment. It is to 
belittle the nobility of mankind to affirm 
that the love of God, of family, of coun- 
try, of liberty, and of justice is a senti- 
ment. This natural affection is a priori 



AMERICA AND THE WAR 9 

and inborn ; it is dictated by the sense of 
self-preservation; it is an elementary 
principle of being. For country, family, 
and liberty men will fight until the end of 
time. In well-constructed human beings 
sentiment plays a minor part. At so 
grave a time as this Americans need no 
such artificial stimulus as sentiment to 
induce them to support their Govern- 
ment in an international issue involving 
the safety of their country, their fami- 
lies, and their liberty. As is the case 
with most abstractions, sentiment would 
not at any time be a safe criterion for 
public measures. It is as often ill 
founded as well founded, and conse- 
quently it is never a prudent or a de- 
liberate reason for the great finality of a 
nation. It is the national interest and 
honor alone which in the end control the 
external actions of a state. In any dis- 
cussion of the problems involved in 



10 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

this war, therefore, sentiment should be 
allowed to play only a minor part. Al- 
liances between nations are not deter- 
mined by considerations of sentiment. 
Common interests and advantages for 
the time being afford the sufficient in- 
ducement for either defensive or offen- 
sive alliances of nations. 

Since the ascent of Prussia to the 
hegemony and direction of Germany, 
English public men have been with rea- 
son profoundly disturbed. They have 
seen with disquietude the long commer- 
cial supremacy of England challenged 
with effect by Germany ; they have seen 
the colonial policy of England and the 
integrity of its widely extended empire 
frequently menaced by unmistakable 
overtures. Indeed, for the last fifty 
years thinking men in England and else- 
where have foreseen that a struggle be- 
tween the English and the German em- 



AMERICA AND THE WAR 11 

pires was inevitable. Men in both na- 
tions have long been shouting, "Delenda 
est Carthago!" to the increasing discom- 
fiture of the rest of the world. Both 
Germany and England have in their own 
way silently prepared for the struggle, 
indirectly by alliances and international 
conversations, and directly by increased 
armaments either on the land or on the 
sea. It would have been far better for 
the Entente Allies if England had not 
confined her preliminary preparations so 
largely to the seas. Her allies have 
been forced to bear the brunt of her over- 
sight. Indeed, it would have been far 
less costly to the British Empire itself 
had England's preparations on land 
kept better step with the pace of the Ger- 
man Empire. Mr. Lloyd George has 
lately admitted that England somewhat 
neglected the obvious duty to arm on 
land, and that the neglect would not 



12 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

occur again. England 's excuse for neg- 
lect is no mystery. She used her na- 
tional resources the better to extend for 
the time being her challenged commercial 
supremacy. 

In so far as America was concerned, 
England's increased armament was 
never disquieting. All the other ex- 
ternal actions of England were not, how- 
ever, so reassuring to America. Ante- 
rior to the War of 1914 many English 
statesmen endeavored to come to an un- 
derstanding with Germany. In such a 
possible understanding lurked the great- 
est peril to this country. As existing 
national alliances and ententes are very 
temporary, it is thought by some public 
men, even in England's own empire, that 
this country has not yet escaped all ulti- 
mate danger of such an association. 
Regardless of that now remote possibil- 
ity, the interest of America in the pres- 



AMERICA AND THE WAR 13 

ent conflict unquestionably lies with 
England and her allies. To aid France 
Cardinal Richelieu did not hesitate to 
promote Protestantism. He was a 
statesman of the first order. Any mina- 
tory combinations of the great powers 
which the future may unfold are too re- 
mote to furnish ground for any hesitancy 
on the part of America to cooperate 
heartily with England and her allies 
throughout the present war. Neverthe- 
less, the American aims in the final is- 
sues of the war are not and cannot be 
identical with the ends of England. In 
Asia their separate interests have of late 
widely diverged. It is reasonably clear 
that the pronounced aims of Mr. Lloyd 
George are not even now the aims of 
most of the other leading public men of 
England. It is therefore safe to predict 
that the program of Mr. Lloyd George 
will not be prominent in the final adjust- 



14 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

ments of the pending war by the powers. 
As to the respective merits of the two 
leading belligerents, England and Ger- 
many, in the War of 1914, America has 
not hesitated to form an opinion. Eng- 
land is a free and great country. Her 
public men are far more astute in the 
business of government than the German 
public men or any other public men. 
Even the English colonial empire, the 
duration of which is much involved in 
this war, has, since the independence of 
America, been admirably administered 
in the main, and the high commercial 
principles applied in colonial adminis- 
tration have produced good results. If 
we except the loss of liberty and inde- 
pendence of some of the subject popula- 
tions of England, there has been little to 
condemn in the English colonial system. 
In all her colonies England has had since 
1783 more regard for justice and human 



AMERICA AND THE WAR 15 

rights than has ever been displayed by 
any other colonial system. It is this 
fact which has made the dependent 
status tolerable in the English colonies 
and dependencies, and in several in- 
stances even desirable for them. It is 
the general opinion in America that the 
colonial system of England has for a 
century been more nearly perfect than 
any other colonial system known to his- 
tory. There is not, however, a general 
consensus in America that the English 
colonial system either in India or Egypt 
is abstractly justifiable. But taking the 
English colonial system as it is, this 
country, as a whole, has not viewed with 
favor the desires of Germany to disrupt 
or partition it. 

It is not extreme to affirm that the am- 
bition of Germany to enter the ranks of 
the great colonial powers has been con- 
templated with disfavor not only in 



16 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

America, but by the entire non-Germanic 
world. America in the main distrusts, 
with or without sound reason, all colo- 
nial systems whatever, but particularly 
the German. Of those existing it un- 
doubtedly favors the British. American 
sympathies with the colonial system of 
England have in the pending conflict 
been much promoted by the conviction 
that since 1914 the Germans have delib- 
erately violated the laws of war, labori- 
ously built up since the time of Grotius. 
The early attempt of England to starve 
by a new system of blockade the civilian 
population of Germany did not meet 
with prompt condemnation in America 
because of the coarse German methods 
of warfare and the instinctive conviction 
of Americans that Germany was as hos- 
tile to America as to England. It was 
foreseen from the outset that the War of 
1914, beyond all other modern wars, was 



AMERICA AND THE WAR 17 

bound to be a war a outrance, and that 
American interests were likely to be 
gravely imperiled by the leading bellig- 
erents. The President and the present 
Government were evidently from the be- 
ginning deeply concerned, and they acted 
with caution and uniform discretion. 
As the sequel showed, their concern was 
well founded. 

Americans are not a thoughtless peo- 
ple, and they are now beginning to think 
of the future, after the present war shall 
end. That the past alliances between 
nations have not been of long duration 
history demonstrates to them. At pres- 
ent America finds herself engaged on 
the side of four or five powers of the first 
rank; some of them have long been 
friendly to America, others not uni- 
formly so. The alliance, or, if pre- 
ferred, the present coordination, of 
America with the Entente powers, is en- 



18 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

tirely fortuitous; it is pursuant to no 
treaty, or even international conversa- 
tion. It is dictated, as all other inter- 
national arrangements and alliances 
have, in fact, been dictated, solely by the 
best interests for the time being and the 
supposed safety of the allied countries. 
All such alliances are at best but tem- 
porary. In the past England and 
France have more often been enemies 
than allies. In the more general con- 
flicts of the world America and England 
have heretofore been uniformly enemies. 
France and Russia have in turn been 
enemies and allies. Prussia and Eng- 
land have been both allies and enemies. 
France and Prussia have been allied 
against England, while Austria, France, 
and Russia have been allies against Eng- 
land and Prussia combined. The past 
combinations, indeed, have been very 
curious and inconsistent. In each in- 



AMERICA AND THE WAR 19 

stance the supposed interest of the allies 
alone governed. The course of history 
never stops. What has been will be 
again. 1 

i The inconsistent alliances between European coun- 
tries are enumerated by a recent French writer as 
follows : 

The alliances of Burgundy and England against 
France, then of Burgundy and France against Eng- 
land; of France, Venice, and Turkey against Austria 
and Spain ; of France, Saxony, and the Palatinate 
against Austria; of France, Sweden, and the Nether- 
lands against Spain and Austria; of France and 
Prussia against Austria and England, then of Aus- 
tria, France, Sweden, and Russia against Prussia 
and England ; of France, Spain, and the United States 
against England ; of all the nations of Europe against 
France; of France, England, and Piedmont against 
Russia; of France and Italy against Austria; the 
moral or immoral entente of Prussia, England, and 
France against Austria; alliance of Prussia and the 
North German States, morally aided by England, 
against France; of France and Russia against Ger- 
many, Austria, and Italy, with England in the back- 
ground; of Japan and England against Russia; in 
order to bring about the present combination, in 
which fabricators of empty phrases see the supreme 
struggle between "civilization" and "barbarism/' but 
in which well-informed minds see only a new and 
intense form of a conflict of interests dividing Eu- 
rope and the world. [Translated from "Hier, Au- 
jourd'hui, Demain," p. 155, Bourassa.] 



20 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

That the policy of America in the 
present war should be formulated by its 
statesmen, and not by its politicians, is 
evident. Statesmen govern a country 
with an eye to the future good of the na- 
tion. Politicians are mere opportunists. 
The difference between them is marked. 
Taking into consideration the brevity of 
all international alliances, the impera- 
tive duty of American statesmen is to 
make sure that in the course of a tem- 
porary alliance with European powers 
the best interests of the American na- 
tion are not imperiled. There are with 
the allies of America outstanding prob- 
lems of grave importance. Any error 
in regard to them will inflict untold mis- 
eries upon posterity. Most interna- 
tional alliances, while necessary, are full 
of ultimate dangers. For this reason 
European alliances have not been here- 
tofore favored in America. That they 



AMERICA AND THE WAR 21 

have now become necessary and must 
long continue is generally admitted, al- 
though it is a departure from an ancient 
tradition. Unintentionally, America has 
against her will at last been forced to 
enter a new and difficult foreign arena. 
The great question is, Will it adequately 
prepare for the new responsibilities 
which the entrance entails! If it does 
not, the future of America will be un- 
necessarily jeoparded, and the natural 
course of American history will be much 
influenced. 

To the world in general the "United 
States' ' par excellence is known as 
1 ' America.' ' In the course of these pa- 
pers America has therefore been ac- 
cepted as the more familiar title of the 
United States. Only in some instances, 
where greater particularity was essen- 
tial to clarity, has the official designation 
been employed. 



CHAPTER n 

BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 

To enforce Belgian neutrality is not 
the primary reason why America en- 
gaged in the war against Germany, nor 
is the violation of the spirit of Ameri- 
can democracy the real reason. The 
great injuries suffered by the Belgians 
in the present war have been deplored 
by Americans, who have done much to 
alleviate the plight of Belgium. 
Throughout their entire national exist- 
ence Americans have evinced a marked 
sense of public justice; they have 
showed themselves to be in the main a 
just and kindly people. But as Amer- 
ica was not a party to the neutraliza- 
22 



BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 23 

tion of Belgium, it is doubtful whether 
an infraction of Belgian neutrality by 
any of the parties to the Neutrality 
Treaty of November 15, 1831, could by 
the law of nations be vindicated by 
America. This was obviously the con- 
clusion at first reached at Washington. 
Americans could and did protest against 
the violation ; but officially America had 
no standing to protest or to vindicate a 
treaty of neutralization to which Amer- 
ica was not a party. 

It is unfortunate that the state of po- 
litical parties and the conditions of her 
parliamentary government did not per- 
mit England to act with more efficiency 
in the first days of the War of 1914. 
That the safety of Belgium was in the 
first instance adequately protected by 
any of the guarantors of her neutrality 
is not clear. The preliminary pourpar- 
lers in 1914 between England and Ger- 



24 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

many, when examined carefully, leave 
the impression that the English minis- 
ters did not insist firmly enough on the 
right of Belgium to immunity from inva- 
sion in the event of war. Up to July 
31, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said to 
the French representative, "The pres- 
ervation of the neutrality of Belgium 
might be, I would not say a decisive, but 
an important factor in determining our 
attitude.' ' (British White Book of 
1914, No. 119.) Would Sir Edward not 
have been justified in making his declar- 
ation stronger? 

Belgium, in the eyes of America, pre- 
sents one of the most melancholy as well 
as one of the most heroic spectacles in 
modern history. Her sad plight has ex- 
cited their profound sympathy. That 
Belgium will emerge intact and resume 
her national existence, Americans hope 
and expect. What the ultimate destiny 



BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 25 

of Belgium may be in the centuries to 
come is another matter which no states- 
man of Europe would venture to pre- 
dict. But one thing may be affirmed: 
Belgium in the future is not going to 
repeat her present experience if it can 
be helped. 

It is an error to assume that Belgium 
is the cause of the war of 1914 or even 
the cause of England's belligerency. 
Belgium is only one incident of the great 
war, not its causa causans. Many peo- 
ple in this country have lost sight of the 
fact that this war is in its origin a war 
for supremacy in the Balkans, which in- 
cidentally set on fire the long-conflicting 
pretensions of Germany and England. 
To the people of the Orient the present 
war is one for the control of the Eu- 
ropean approaches to the far East. To 
the average American the war is one for 
the principle of democracy. But what- 



26 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

ever the object of the war, Americans 
in or out of public life, with ample jus- 
tification, have come to believe that the 
triumphant success of Germany in Eu- 
rope would be disastrous to America. 
It is not compatible with the safety of 
America that there should be only one 
great power in Europe and that power 
unfriendly to America. The arroga- 
tions of such a power would soon extend 
to this hemisphere; they would menace 
its integrity, and possibly destroy for 
centuries the national policies and the 
proper development of America. This 
is a correct, if instinctive, conclusion for 
Americans. 

That the status of Belgium was not the 
primary cause of the war, history dem- 
onstrates. Belgium never has been, ac- 
cording to the publicists' definition, a 
completely sovereign state. Belgium as 
a state was the product of the fears of 



BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 27 

Europe. Torn away from Holland only 
in 1830, Belgium, by the concerted action 
of England and France, was erected into 
an independent, but neutralized, state by 
the convention of the five great powers 
convened in London in the year 1830. 
In the erection of a single state com- 
posed of the Flemish and the Walloon 
provinces, formerly a part of the United 
Netherlands, the racial diversities of the 
Flemings and the Walloons were not 
much considered. Consequently, the 
new state was from its inception left to 
wrestle with the always deplorable bilin- 
gual problems. The choice of a reigning 
house for the new kingdom was not even 
left to Belgium, but was dictated by the 
great powers. The choice of the English 
queen's uncle as the first sovereign was 
agreeable to England, and the arrange- 
ment for his speedy marriage to the 
daughter of Louis Philippe, then King 



28 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

of France, was most pleasing to France, 
as the future dynasty was not likely to 
be hostile to French susceptibilities. 

It will thus be perceived that Belgium 
was allowed to enter the family of na- 
tions only provisionally and because the 
great powers deemed it the best solution 
of a very dangerous territorial problem. 
From the days of Caesar to those of Na- 
poleon, the valley of the Meuse has been 
the pathway and the battle-field of all 
the armies of Europe. In 1830 neither 
France nor England was willing that 
either separately should have para- 
mountcy in the territory since known as 
Belgium. In 1830 an English foothold 
in the Low Countries would have met the 
opposition of all the other great powers. 
At that time Prussia was not in a posi- 
tion to enforce its own views in regard to 
the territory now called Belgium. It 
very reluctantly consented to the propo- 



BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 29 

sals of England and France to sever it 
from Holland, as did Austria and Rus- 
sia; but all the powers recognized that 
England's interest in the Belgian littoral 
was greatest. Indeed, her interest was 
vital. England has long feared that the 
littoral of the Low Countries might pass 
into powerful and unfriendly hands, and 
the supreme effort of her statesmen has 
been directed to frustrating this eventu- 
ality. That her apprehension is both 
legitimate and natural cannot be denied. 
Her bitter enemy, Napoleon the Great, 
discerned that "Antwerp was a pistol 
turned against the heart of England.' ' 
What he neglected to add was that Bel- 
gian territory is a highway which leads 
with equal directness to either Paris or 
Berlin. 

The terrain of both Belgium and the 
Grand Duchy of Luxemburg is very un- 
fortunately situated as regards three of 



30 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

the great powers of Europe. The pres- 
ent German invasion of these territories 
is by no means the first instance of a vio- 
lation by the powers; it is computed by 
competent authority to be the one hun- 
dred and nineteenth invasion. For this 
reason Belgium has been called the 
"Cockpit of Europe." Every military 
scientist in Europe has long formulated 
possible plans for military movements 
on Belgian territory, as the military ar- 
chives of all the great powers might dis- 
close. 

The international situation of the 
Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and of Bel- 
gium is almost identical. If anything, 
Luxemburg was more effectually neu- 
tralized than Belgium. A public man is 
in no position to form a correct opinion 
upon the international status of Belgium 
and the obligations of the guarantors of 
its neutralization if he is not entirely 



BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 31 

familiar with the Luxemburg neutraliza- 
tion treaties of 1839 and 1867, their con- 
struction by the great powers, and the 
subsequent attitude of the signatories to 
such treaties. The international status 
of Belgium was fixed by Articles VII 
and XXV of the treaties of November 
15, 1831, and by Articles I and II of the 
treaty of April 19, 1839. The neutrali- 
zation of Luxemburg was finally effected 
by the treaty of London, signed May 11, 
1867, on the part of Great Britain, 
France, Italy, Eussia, and Prussia. By 
Article II of that treaty the "high con- 
tracting parties engaged to respect the 
principle of neutrality stipulated by the 
present Article." By the prior treaty 
of 1839 the powers collectively guar- 
anteed the peaceful possession of Lux- 
emburg to the King of Holland in the 
fullest, most absolute, and most unquali- 
fied manner. The object of the Luxem- 



32 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

burg treaty was to prevent the possibil- 
ity of Luxemburg passing under the 
control of any of the great powers. The 
effect of the treaty of 1839 was to 
make Luxemburg inalienable. The Eng- 
lish construction of her obligations un- 
der the treaty of 1839 concerning the 
practical neutralization of Luxemburg 
was not, however, fortunate for Belgium 
in 1914. On the threshold of the exist- 
ing hostilities, as appears from that 
most important document, the "British 
White Book," published in England by 
authority in the first days of the pres- 
ent war, M. Cambon, the French am- 
bassador, asked the English foreign 
minister, Sir Edward Grey, "what the 
British Government thinks of the viola- 
tion of Luxemburg by the Germans." 
Sir Edward Grey referred him "to the 
views expressed in 1867 by Lord Derby 
and Lord Clarendon.' ' (White Book, 



BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 33 

No. 148). Sir Edward's answer in- 
volves a historical retrospect. In 1867 
France, prior to the final treaty of that 
year, was negotiating for the acquisi- 
tion of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. 
This expressely violated the treaty of 
1839, on which Prussia relied. In Par- 
liament Sir Robert Peel strongly pro- 
tested against the purchase of Luxem- 
burg by France, following closely the 
annexation of Savoy and Nice, "be- 
cause the holding of Luxemburg is a mat- 
ter of first importance for France, for 
defensive or offensive operations against 
Germany.' ' The question in substance 
in 1867, when France was in treaty for 
Luxemburg, really was, What obliga- 
tions the collective guarantee of the in- 
tegrity of the territory of Luxemburg 
entailed on the signatory powers, and 
whether, if one power disregarded or re- 
tired from the treaty, the others were 



34 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

obligated either individually or jointly to 
enforce by arms the obligations of the 
treaty? Prussia insisted on the binding 
nature of the obligation, as it was clearly 
her interest to do then. Count Bis- 
marck was firm on this point. On June 
14, 1867, according to Hansard (p. 1910, 
seq.), Mr. Labouchere, M. P., in the 
course of Parliamentary debate on the 
treaty of 1839 said: 

. . . The guarantees entered into by this 
country for the independence of Belgium and 
of Turkey stood on very different ground 
from that given recently with respect to 
Luxemburg. Nobody could contend that the 
possession of Luxemburg, either by France 
or Germany, would menace or disturb our 
interests. 



At the time when a war with America 
seemed likely, we might have felt grateful to 
the Emperor of the French for stepping for- 
ward with a guarantee affecting Montreal 



BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 35 

and the Canadian lakes; but would his own 
subjects have been pleased? 

According to M. Moustier, the Foreign 
Minister of France, the "neutrality" of Lux- 
emburg might not be inconsistent with the 
passage of troops through the Duchy. The 
noble Lord appeared to have admitted that 
a violation of the treaty would be constituted 
if an army marched through the territory, 
but a glance at the map would show that it 
was almost impossible that war could be 
waged between France and Germany with- 
out an army passing through the Luxemburg 
territory. If, therefore, we were to take 
Count Bismarck's view of our obligations, we 
should be bound to go to war. Nothing had 
done so much harm to the English name as a 
certain recklessness in undertaking obliga- 
tions and a great discretion in fulfilling 
them. . . . 

. . . Even supposing that England might 
be brought to raise armies and find treasure 
for a war to prevent a Dutch province from 
becoming German or French, was it likely 
that our colonies would incur the risks of war 
for such an object? 



36 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

The nature of the obligation of the 
powers under the Luxemburg guarantee 
of 1839 was in 1869 a subject of deep con- 
cern both in England and on the Conti- 
nent. Prussia was particularly appre- 
hensive. Nevertheless, Lord Stanley, 
then English foreign secretary, in- 
formed Prussia: "No interest of ours 
was either directly or indirectly involved 
and we stood absolutely free and un- 
fettered. The security of Belgium is 
an entirely different matter." (Han- 
sard, Vol. CLXXXVL, p. 1253, seq.) 

Now, Great Britain was a party to the 
neutralization of Luxemburg. Lord 
John Russell, not then in power, alone 
protested against any such narrow con- 
struction of the obligation of England 
under the treaty of 1839, and he bravely 
stated that the position of the English 
Government had created a very un- 
pleasant feeling on the Continent. 



BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 37 

(Hansard, Vol. CLXXXVIIL, p. 975.) 
The relation of Saguntum to the Car- 
thaginians was singularly like Belgium's 
to Germany. The Roman contentions 
concerning Hannibal's violation of the 
treaty relative to Saguntum probably 
offer the nearest parallel to England's 
present contentions concerning the Ger- 
man invasion of Belgium in derogation 
of the Belgian treaty of 1831. In the 
negotiations for peace the Roman argu- 
ment is not likely to be overlooked by 
those trained in the art of diplomacy. 

The attitude of the powers to the Lux- 
emburg treaties leaves the impression 
that the right of a signatory to contra- 
vene or to withdraw from its conven- 
tional guaranty is not clearly denied in 
public law. The alleged right of a signa- 
tory to violate the pact is a grave mat- 
ter, and it certainly shocks the moral 
sense of private people when a party to 



38 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

a neutralization treaty withdraws and 
then violates it. But the nature and ex- 
tent of the obligation of a guarantor of 
neutrality is, in international law, not so 
clearly laid down as it should be. The 
English position that there was no obli- 
gation of the parties to the Luxemburg 
treaty to enforce it by a resort to arms, 
unless their own interests were also vio- 
lated, leaves a very unpleasant impres- 
sion when applied to Belgium. That a 
treaty of neutralization was violated 
with impunity in the instance of Luxem- 
burg must be conceded, and this is the 
unhappy lesson of Luxemburg. The un- 
certainty of the attitude of the great 
powers in regard to neutralization trea- 
ties long stared Belgium in the face, and 
consequently its apprehensions were first 
directed to one great power and then to 
another. The annexation of Korea by 
Japan in 1910, with the consent of the 



BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 39 

powers, after Japan had guaranteed the 
independence of Korea in 1904, was om- 
inous for Belgium. 

If the often-avowed projects for the 
neutralization of either Mexico or Can- 
ada by the great powers ever come to 
maturity, America will then be con- 
fronted by a set of problems concerning 
neutralized countries of the gravest im- 
portance to her own internal safety and 
security. It is highly desirable, there- 
fore, that the status of neutralized coun- 
tries and the nature of the obligations 
of the guarantors of neutrality should 
receive a closer consideration than they 
yet have received in the law of nations. 
A neutralized state may, in some of its 
aspects, yet prove embarrassing for 
America. In late public utterances of 
many leading Americans regarding neu- 
tralized countries there seem to be cer- 
tain assumptions quite inadmissible in 



40 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

respect to a Canada or a Mexico neutral- 
ized by the powers. Had the former 

Republic of Texas been neutralized, as 
once proposed, or had California been 
ceded to Great Britain by Mexico, as 
once attempted, the intricacy of the law 
of neutralization would now be more 
apparent to Americans. If the United 
States had joined in the proposed neu- 
tralization of the former Republic of 
Texas by England and France, would it 
then have been at liberty to recede from 
the treaty when Texas itself desired to 
be annexed to the United States? If 
the United States first had denounced 
such a treaty and declined to engage in 
it further, would France and England 
then have been obligated to enforce the 
neutralization of the Republic of Texas 
by a recourse to arms? Such are the 
serious questions which a treaty of neu- 
tralization presents. 



BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 41 

According to the British " White 
Book," on the first signs of the great 
conflict of 1914 Sir Edward Grey offi- 
cially inquired in Paris and Berlin 
whether the French and German gov- 
ernments are "prepared to engage to 
respect the neutrality of Belgium so long 
as no other power violates it." (114.) 
The German chancellor replied that Ger- 
many would like to know what France 
is prepared to do. (122).) The reply 
from Paris was "that the French Gov- 
ernment are resolved to respect the neu- 
trality of Belgium, unless some other 
power violated it." (125.) On August 
1, 1914, the German ambassador at Lon- 
don asked Sir Edward Grey whether, if 
Germany gave a promise not to violate 
Belgian neutrality, England would en- 
gage to remain neutral. Sir Edward 
Grey did not think "we could give a 
promise of neutrality on that condition 



-; AMERICA \y kB 

man ambas- 
sador then suggested that the infagi 

.-. ;/'./-../> might bo 

guaranteed b; N. definite 

rep s v<weh&:-. . simply 

bound. :ly the 

gre; hft empires, lone 

:ill the cor.. - .red 

it 1:. s I :n a 

IspOG ry iniii' 

expert in Europe had announced 
terr \>uld inevitably be a battle- 

j 



CHAPTER III 

That the War of 1914 could be con- 
fined to the Balkans do profound Eng- 
lish statesman could have believed; yet 
the early efforts of both England and 
Germany in 1914 were apparently di- 
rected to that end alone. Had the war 
been so confined, it would have been sat- 
isfactory only to Austria-Hungary. It 
must have been known in England from 
the first menace of hostilities against 
Serbia by Austria-Hungary that in any 
such conflict Serbia would not be aban- 
doned by Russia. The Balkan history 
of the last half of the century preceding 
demonstrated that Russia could not 

43 



44 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

abandon the Slavs to Austrian domina- 
tion. That Germany would stand by 
Austria-Hungary as against Russia was 
equally clear. The French ambassadors 
in London and St. Petersburg most 
frankly stated "that France would ad- 
here to Russia at every step." (White 
Book, No. 6.) The only possibility of 
preventing the extension of the Balkan 
war to all Europe was that England 
should promptly declare its intention to 
stand with France and Russia in the 
event of a European war. If England 
so declared, she was advised by Russia, 
France, and Italy that a general Eu- 
ropean war involving all the great pow- 
ers could be avoided. This is proved 
by the official documents contained in the 
British White Book of 1914. The Rus- 
sian foreign minister, M. SazonofT, in 
July, 1914, stated to the English rep- 
resentative in St. Petersburg that if 



THE BALKANS 45 

England "took her stand with France 
and Eussia, there would be no war," but 
that if England "failed them now, 
rivers of blood would flow," and Eng- 
land "would in the end be dragged 
in." (No. 17.) On July 27 the Eussian 
ambassador in London deplored the ef- 
fect of the impression that England 
would stand aside. (No. 47.) M. Pale- 
ologue, the French ambassador at St. 
Petersburg, urged England to the same 
effect. On July 29 the Marquis of San 
Giuliano gave to the British ambassador 
Italy's opinion, "If Germany believed 
that Great Britain would act with Eussia 
and France, it would have a great ef- 
fect." (No. 80.) President Poincare 
in behalf of France, on July 30, 1914, 
stated to the British ambassador at 
Paris, "if his Majesty's Government an- 
nounced that England would come to the 
aid of France in the result of a conflict 



46 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

. . . there would be no war. " (No. 99.) 
President Poincare reiterated this in his 
letter to King George V of England, 
dated July 31, 1914. But England did 
not, or could not for some reason, act. 
It seems now as if a titanic struggle in 
Europe was fated by errors of policy 
from the beginning, and that it was be- 
yond the powers of the statesmen of any 
single country to prevent the dire calam- 
ity. The apprehensions, the fears, and 
the rival ambitions of the nations of Eu- 
rope all tended to make a general war 
inevitable when the Balkan fires were 
relighted in 1914. 

The preliminary transactions between 
the powers in July and August, 1914, 
when the war between Austria and Ser- 
bia loomed up, are contained in the Brit- 
ish White Book. On July 24, 1914, the 
French ambassador at St. Petersburg 
gave the British ambassador to under- 



THE BALKANS 47 

stand "that France would fulfill all their 
obligations entailed by her alliance with 
Russia, if necessity arose, besides sup- 
porting Russia strongly in any diplo- 
matic negotiations. ,, (No. 6.) On July 
29, 1914, Sir Edward Grey communicated 
to Sir Francis Bertie in Paris that the 
Balkan war " would then be a question 
of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav — 
a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans ; 
and our idea had always been to avoid 
being drawn into a war over a Balkan 
question." (No. 87.) The British am- 
bassador at St. Petersburg had previ- 
ously stated to the French ambassador 
that "direct British interests in Serbia 
were nil, and a war on behalf of that 
country would never be sanctioned by 
British public opinion." (No. 6.) 

That the British interests in the Bal- 
kans were not "nil," England knew, and 
it is now apparent to the world that Eng- 



48 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

lish interests in Serbia are not nil. Had 
Russia been triumphant and Austria- 
Hungary effaced, a great Slav power un- 
der the hegemony of Russia would have 
been erected in the Balkans. This 
would have been most disturbing to Eng- 
lish susceptibilities, and to Great Brit- 
ain^ interests in Asia and Africa. 
Since the war began it has been correctly 
stated in England by an English subject, 
who has devoted much critical attention 
to the " Eastern questions,' ' that in the 
event of Russia 's triumph in the Balkans 
English imperialists would have been 
obliged to promote the military strength 
of the German Empire as a counterpoise 
to the dreaded Russian ascendency. 
Now that the Central powers are for the 
moment in practical control of the Bal- 
kans, the danger of the Balkans to Eng- 
lish interests is no longer concealed in 
England. The Balkan question is, in 



THE BALKANS 49 

fact, an ominous spectre in all intelli- 
gent governmental circles in England, 
for in it are involved many future perils 
to the different powers, but most directly 
of all to the extended English Empire. 

The Austria-Hungary war of 1914 
against Serbia was "the postponed se- 
quel of the war of 1912. ' ' That Ger- 
many would aid Austria against Russia 
was certain. Ever since the days of 
Frederick II of Prussia the inhabitants 
of Germany have been in fear of Rus- 
sian invasion. It was to prevent the 
overweening growth of Russia that oc- 
casioned the first partition of Poland. 
It was a national fear of Russia in Ger- 
many which in the end mobilized even the 
Social Democrats behind German diplo- 
macy in the present Great War, (Eng- 
lish "Contemporary Review' ' for Sep- 
tember, 1914). 

The Balkan question is not compli- 



50 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

cated. When the Ottoman Empire had 
been virtually destroyed in Europe, the 
Balkan question became primarily an 
issue between Austria and Russia for the 
hegemony of the small States through 
which led most directly the land passages 
from Europe to Asia, Africa, and the 
seas adjacent. For a time Russia and 
Austria worked in close association in 
the Balkans. Austria was allowed pre- 
dominance in Serbia and Russia in Bul- 
garia. It was when Russian diplomacy 
became most influential in Serbia also 
that the general European peace was 
first threatened. 

At this fateful epoch in the world's 
history the most immediate of all the 
problems of the moment is, What will be- 
come of Russia, Turkey, and the Bal- 
kans? The interest of America in this 
question is not direct. That the Balkan 
questions should be intruded at all into 



THE BALKANS 51 

American policies is highly undesirable. 
There are indications that there is al- 
ready a rift in the entente between Amer- 
ica and England on this point. Mr. Bal- 
four significantly announced to Parlia- 
ment, July 29 of last year, " America had 
[has] no interest on the Continent" of 
Europe. This announcement is appa- 
rently not in accord with late official dec- 
larations at Washington, nor is it con- 
sistent with all the causes officially as- 
signed for America's entrance into the 
European War. 

With proper regard to the future 
safety of the United States, it cannot be 
conceded that it is the policy of the 
United States to promote the proposed 
neutralization of any of the Balkan 
States, under some guaranty by the 
great powers, to be contained in the final 
treaty of peace which will terminate the 
present general war. The United States 



52 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

has no national interest in the Balkans. 
Even if the Balkan States should urge 
the JInited States to become a party to 
their neutralization, it is to he hoped that 
it will decline. 

The proximity of a feeble power to a 
great one makes neutralization guaran- 
ties highly coveted in the weaker state. 
For this reason it has been suggested 
that Canada and Mexico should ulti- 
mately be neutralized by international 
guaranties of the great powers. That 
any such neutralization of Canada or 
Mexico would be inimical to the interests 
of America in any future war between 
the United States and a great European 
or a great Asiatic power, military men 
will concede. In any such war it would 
be indispensable to the security of Amer- 
ica that its military forces should imme- 
diately bar any approach to this conti- 
nent through the open doors of either 



THE BALKANS 53 

Canada or Mexico. While Americans 
prize liberty in the abstract, the first care 
of their Government should be the lib- 
erty of Americans, and not that of some 
remote people alien to them in blood and 
institutions. It was some such reason 
in all probability which induced the as- 
tute English statesmen to refrain from 
taking a final position in regard to the 
true construction of the Luxemburg 
treaties already mentioned. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE SEQUEL OF THE WAB 

When the present Great War shall 
have subsided, how will America stand 
in relation to the rest of the world? In 
what way will her peculiar interests be 
affected by the possible international ar- 
rangements which will in the usual 
course conclude the war? These are 
now questions of more than ordinary 
moment to the future peace and pros- 
perity of America. No doubt the ques- 
tions themselves are receiving the anx- 
ious consideration of the present Gov- 
ernment. 

The interests of America most con- 
cerned in the final treaties which will 

54 



THE SEQUEL OF THE WAR 55 

embody the consummation of this great- 
est of modern wars may be classified as 
(1) Mexican, (2) Canadian, (3) West 
Indian, (4) Asiatic, and Pacific. Cur- 
sory suggestions in regard to each of 
these interests are contained in these ar- 
ticles. It is not pretended that they are 
other than tentative; but it is thought 
that at this important moment the sug- 
gestions, such as they are, may serve to 
stimulate their better discussion. 

To some extent the interests indicated 
must be affected by the outcome of the 
present World War. That at the end of 
the war the alliance between Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Em- 
pire will not be disrupted is most prob- 
able. It is a natural alliance dictated 
by the interests of the German Empire, 
Austria, and Turkey. The alliance 
ought not to be regarded as offensive to 
America. Nor is its continuation hostile 



56 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

to the best interests of America, for in 
that event France, England, Italy, and 
Japan of the great powers will necessar- 
ily be interested to remain in very close 
and friendly association with America. 
An alliance of the Central powers will 
make the continuation of the i i Entente ' ' 
highly desirable for England, France, 
Italy, Japan, and America. There will 
thus be a new and more effective " bal- 
ance ' ' of the great powers. Such an as- 
sociation of the great powers must tend 
to the advantage of America, for it con- 
duces to a more satisfactory solution of 
the pressing Mexican and Japanese 
problems in particular. 

At the moment it looks as if Russia 
would usurp the place of the Balkans in 
the chancelleries of Europe. If Russia 
remains intact, and a stable government 
of all the Russias comes soon, that Rus- 
sia will for the time being adhere most 



THE SEQUEL OF THE WAE 57 

closely to France and America seems 
probable. But the Russian situation is 
not reassuring. That a permanent form 
of government is likely to arise in Russia 
within a decade is not probable unless 
the monarchy is meanwhile restored. 

What, then, is to become of the vast 
Russian domain in the event of more se- 
rious internal commotions is with rea- 
son troubling every statesman in every 
state in Europe. For a long time to 
come the final destiny of Russia and her 
Asiatic provinces must necessarily con- 
tinue to usurp the most important place 
in the diplomacy of Europe. If Russia 
should by any means drift back to her 
former dynasty, it will apparently be un- 
der a modified and more liberal consti- 
tution. That disorder and insecurity of 
property will be allowed to continue in 
Russia is most improbable. In time the 
property classes and the intelligent no- 



58 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

bility of Russia will doubtless make some 
overt effort looking to a reaction and 
the restoration of the ancient and his- 
toric monarchy. Should the monarchy 
be restored with the consent of the Rus- 
sians, America will have little to appre- 
hend. The ancient dynasty of Russia 
has exhibited the greatest friendliness 
to America and in the most critical mo- 
ments of American history. It is to this 
friendship that America owes the 
princely domain of Alaska and its de- 
pendencies. It was not advantageous to 
Canada or the English interests that 
Alaska should pass to America, but the 
Russian dynasty ignored their opposi- 
tion and ceded Alaska to America. 
Such friendly generosity on the part of 
the late dynasty and its conduct in the 
civil war of 1861-65 Americans are not 
likely to forget when the American prob- 
lems to the north of the 49th degree of 



THE SEQUEL OF THE WAR 59 

north latitude become more critical, as 
they necessarily will with time. 

America is not interested in imposing 
any particular form of government on 
Russia. With the internal government 
of any country in Europe America has 
no concern so long as American institu- 
tions are not menaced by that country. 
America has no interest in the forms of 
government adopted by European coun- 
tries. Lloyd George, who stands pre- 
eminently for the democracy of England, 
has very recently stated that such was 
the English position concerning the do- 
mestic institutions of all foreign coun- 
tries. Mr. Balfour, who is personally a 
representative of a very different class 
of Englishmen, the professional govern- 
ing aristocracy of England, in July of 
last year officially stated that "no one 
was foolish enough to suppose that it 
would be possible to impose'' on a for- 



60 AMEEICA AFTER THE WAR 

eign country "a constitution made out- 
side of that country.' ' He very prop- 
erly added that "nations must make 
their scheme of liberty for themselves 
according to their own ideas and based 
on their history, character, and hopes." 

This statement has much commended 
itself to the intelligence of most thought- 
ful Americans. America has now noth- 
ing to fear from Germany so long as 
England, France, Italy, and Japan are 
not estranged. 

The present entente between France 
and England is likely to be durable. As 
the French ambassador, M. Cambon, 
said in London to Sir Edward Grey, in 
July, 1914 : "It could not be to England's 
interest that France should be crushed 
by Germany. Great Britain would then 
be in a very diminished position with re- 
gard to Germany. In 1870 Great Brit- 
ain had made a great mistake in allow- 



THE SEQUEL OF THE WAR 61 

ing an enormous increase of German 
strength. . . ." (119.) That France 
should continue an independent and un- 
diminished state has now become impor- 
tant to English security. The safety of 
both powers is seen to depend in the fu- 
ture upon their entente. Had Russia, by 
means of this war, assumed the hege- 
mony of Europe, and had France contin- 
ued in close alliance with her on all 
Eastern questions, the English under- 
standing with France might speedily 
have been jeoparded; but no such con- 
dition is now likely to ensue within 
any reasonable space of time. There- 
fore the continued entente between 
France and England is measurably sure 
to endure for a considerable space after 
this present war is terminated. 

The future position of Russia is ad- 
mitted in Europe to be uncertain. That 
Russia will be reconstructed ultimately 



62 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

on the ancient plan and in conformity 
with the principles of the governments 
most nearly adjacent to her is generally 
regarded in Europe as the most natural 
solution. In Asia the future of Russia 
excites apprehension. Japan would 
have ground for alarm if the naturally 
strong, disciplined, and effectual Ger- 
man system were by any chance extended 
to the Pacific. Japan is therefore di- 
rectly interested at present in preserving 
a good understanding with all the En- 
tente powers, including America. That 
this entente cordiale will conduce to the 
interests of America is apparent. It can 
be destroyed only by the improbable dis- 
ruption of the alliance between the Cen- 
tral powers of Europe. 

The problems of America after the 
war will not be confined to foreign af- 
fairs. The inevitable increase in taxa- 
tion by the Federal Government, the 



THE SEQUEL OF THE WAR 63 

probable rapid diminution in the remu- 
neration of labor, and the increased cost 
of living due to the war will doubtless 
create popular unrest such as has never 
before been known in America. That 
the Government will prove equal to the 
maintenance of order there is no reason 
from its past history to doubt. The at- 
tachment of Americans to their familiar 
institutions is so great that mere adver- 
sity or misfortune alone will not cause 
them to change their institutions. The 
perpetuation of the republic in America 
is for a long period as certain as any 
human institution of government can be, 
but the need for fostering the interests 
already indicated will be made apparent 
to the Government when the period of 
unrest becomes acute. 



CHAPTER V 

MEXICO 

After the general peace ending the 
present Great War the American Gov- 
ernment will be compelled to pay closer 
attention to the disturbed state of Mex- 
ico. The great increase of America's 
national debt, her increased taxation, 
and the artificial limitations placed on 
her ability to cope with either England 
or Germany in world commerce will com- 
pel America to promote better condi- 
tions of trade and intercourse on her own 
continent. To this end Mexico must be 
pacified and the Government made more 
stable. Stability and security are press- 
ing needs not only of the property 

64 



MEXICO 65 

classes in Mexico, but of the Mexican la- 
borers as well. Without prosperity in 
Mexico, humanitarians should clearly 
understand, the condition of its lower 
classes cannot be ameliorated. More- 
over, the safety and the freedom of 
Americans ' trade is directly involved in 
the Mexican problem. After the gen- 
eral peace the American Government 
will not long be suffered to continue a 
policy of inaction and indifference to 
the internal conditions of Mexico. 

Other and more peremptory motives 
will ultimately lead America to a re- 
vision of its policy of inaction. No 
scheme of defensive warfare which 
omits a reference to Mexico can be com- 
plete for the United States of America. 
The northern boundary of Mexico, as 
fixed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hi- 
dalgo in 1848 and the Gadsden Treaty 
of 1853, extends along the southern fron- 



66 AMERICA AFTEE THE WAR 

tier of the United States for nearly 2000 
miles. The occupation of Mexico by a 
European or Asiatic power of the first 
rank at war with the United States 
doubtless would and should be pre- 
vented. At the first sign of such a pos- 
sibility the seaports of Mexico would be 
a subject of serious consideration by the 
military authorities of the United States. 
That Mexican ports should not offer a 
harbor for the enemy would be a mat- 
ter of as much concern in Washington 
as that the harbors of the Chesapeake 
or of San Diego and San Francisco Bay 
should not offer them a safe landing. 
If Mexico were then neutralized, the 
neutrality of Mexico would inevitably 
be subordinated to considerations in- 
volving the safety and the integrity of a 
great and populous nation. America 
has a high and commendable moral con- 
ception of the effect of a country's neu- 



MEXICO 67 

tralization, but in the last resort it can- 
not deliberately permit itself to be de- 
stroyed. The world would not expect 
that America would allow itself to be 
overrun from Mexico. 

It is not only the military significance 
of Mexico which makes it of serious im- 
portance to the United States, but its 
trade, and the unlimited possibilities of 
its greater development under a stable 
Government. Properly governed, Mexi- 
can commerce with its nearest neighbor, 
the United States, would be of incalcu- 
lable value not only to the Mexicans 
themselves, but to America. The fertile 
areas, the valuable mines, and the un- 
limited resources of Mexico would, if 
properly developed under a competent 
and orderly Government, add prodi- 
giously to the riches and the foreign 
trade of the United States. The config- 
uration of Mexico in reference to the 



68 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

United States makes it certain that Mex- 
ico and the United States are destined to 
some closer commercial association and 
some defensive alliance. Had the moun- 
tain chains of North America run east 
and west instead of north and south, the 
future history of the countries, now un- 
der separate and distinct governments, 
would be very different from what it is 
destined to be. The configuration of the 
territory of a nation with reference to 
that of bordering nations is a most im- 
portant factor in both its economic and 
its political development. We have only 
to glance at the histories of Greece and 
Italy to be convinced of the truth of this 
statement. 

The history of Mexico since its escape 
from Spanish domination in 1821 shows 
a lamentable defect in the capacity of 
Mexicans for self-government. Since its 
virtual independence of Spain, with the 



MEXICO 69 

exception of the regime of Porfirio Diaz 
from 1884 to 1911, the history of Mexico 
is a tale of almost continuous warfare, 
in which Maximilian's empire is a mere 
episode. During all this long period life 
and property have been insecure, and the 
misgovernment such as no neighboring 
power of the first rank other than the 
United States would have suffered to 
endure so long in any country contigu- 
ous to it. Instead of receiving commen- 
dation for its toleration of Mexico 's mis- 
government, the Government of the 
United States has been censured by all 
the older political communities of Eu- 
rope. That the Washington Govern- 
ment is largely responsible for the dis- 
order of Mexico is believed in Europe. 
The Monroe Doctrine prevents any for- 
eign nation taking the place of Spain in 
Mexico, and it morally obligates the 
United States to do that which it will 



70 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

not permit any foreign Government to 
do. Unless something is soon done by 
America to set the Mexican house in or- 
der, it is reasonably sure that some sort 
of foreign intervention will be suggested 
at no distant time after the general 
peace. European activities in this hem- 
isphere will not subside with the general 
peace. They can be regulated only by 
the prompt action of America in the in- 
terest of tranquillity in Mexico. 

It is within the power of the Washing- 
ton Government to bring about a better 
state of things in Mexico. Nor need the 
exercise of this power imperil the inde- 
pendence of Mexico. This would be de- 
plored in America, The hegemony of 
the United States in North America can, 
if desired, be asserted as effectually in 
Mexico as in Cuba, and with as favorable 
results. It is the conviction of any real 
necessity for action which has been lack- 



MEXICO 71 

ing at Washington, and it is the want of 
conviction which is receiving the censure 
of the rest of the world. The Govern- 
ment at Washington is constituted for 
the purpose of promoting the safety and 
the highest development of the United 
States. The Government cannot always 
wait for popular mandates concerning 
every detail of its foreign policies. The 
people expect their Government to gov- 
ern and they have a right to expect that 
it will govern well. As yet the great 
mass of Americans have not seen fit to 
intrude their opinions on the Mexican 
question; but this state of things is un- 
likely to last. 

Ignoring the defects of the Spanish 
administration of three centuries, it 
must be conceded that the great and in- 
teresting cities of Mexico were founded 
under Spanish rule. The admirable ar- 
chitecture of Mexico, which bids fair to 



n AMERICA AFTER THE WAB 

neutral in the future of CSaUi 
m San Uiegc :; San F: ,\ is 

hJs qlc tc Spain. Any permanent ex- 
:.;: in the laws :: Mexico is derived 
from Spain. 

I: iy remarked in an in- 

fluential American journal that the 
population /: Mexico, like that of other 

ntries, is composed of three classes. 

pper, middle, and low" ("Tra 
St □ : y •; : Martyred Mexico "). Under 
Spain the upper class of Mexicans was 
perhaps more highly reined than that 
of i her par: of North Amen 

He who would have a correct idea of fa 
bc in Mex, nry since must 

turn to the pages of Mine. Calderon de 
la Barca, the wife of the first Spanish 
minister accredited to Mexico after its 
independence ("life in Mexico"). It 
is a & content of no little value, published 

the instance of the historian Prescott. 



MEXICO 73 

At the present day the general refine- 
ment of the upper class of Mexico re- 
mains quite equal to that of the more in- 
telligent classes of the United States. 
This fact Americans are apt to ignore. 
Few Americans who adventure into Mex- 
ico come to know the inner life of the 
Mexicans. 

It is the orderly upper class of Mexico 
who would most welcome the security 
which the United States is alone able to 
afford to Mexico. That the life of the 
lower classes of Mexicans, the Indians 
and the mestizos, could be ameliorated 
by the friendly and proper intervention 
of the United States there can be no 
question. That the present state of 
things in Mexico will be allowed by 
America to continue indefinitely it is 
counter to the course of history to sup- 
pose. It is the duty of the Government 
of the United States to undertake the 



74 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

pacification and reorganization of Mex- 
ico very soon after the general peace, 
and to see to it that there is set up in that 
unfortunate and superlatively beautiful 
country, close to the United States, a 
Government worthy of its potentialities. 
It is only in this way that the United 
States can fulfil on this continent its 
natural responsibilities and its high des- 
tiny. When it is the national will that 
peace and security shall be brought about 
in Mexico by Washington, it can be ac- 
complished with no impairment of Mexi- 
can independence. This the history of 
American intervention in Cuba dem- 
onstrates. That intelligent Americans 
would deplore the loss of independence 
by Mexico is certain. Only a few Amer- 
ican adventurers desire its annexation 
by the United States. The intelligent 
classes of America recognize clearly the 
natural limitations imposed by their 



MEXICO 75 

form of government, and it is the intel- 
ligent classes of all countries who in the 
cn<l frame its policies. The continua- 
tion of an independent, but a more or- 
derly and safer, Mexico is the only wish 
of the people of the United States at 
the present time. 

Under the auspices of a patriotic and 
eminent American, Archbishop Ireland 
of St. Paul, a brief, but powerful, rjicture 
of the degraded political conditions long 
prevailing in Mexico has very lately 
been given to the world. The sketch of 
the revolutionary governments since the 
expulsion of Spain is concise and ac- 
curate. The rapine, the murderous con- 
duct, and the general disorder and 
insecurity of the Mexico of a century 
past are there given with substantial ac- 
curacy and without exaggeration. It 
makes a sorry picture. 

Constant revolutions in Mexico mean 



76 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

that there can be no stability either in 
public or private affairs. The insecu- 
rity of the property of American nation- 
als in Mexico the American Government 
has the power to ignore; but no great 
Government can persistently neglect 
such interests without condemnation in 
the end. Action will follow the more 
spirited condemnation that must soon 
exhibit itself after the general peace. 
In view of the established foreign policy 
of America, formulated in the Monroe 
Doctrine, it is not safe for America to 
continue Jto ignore the Mexican depreda- 
tions committed against foreign subjects 
and citizens. America must either act 
in Mexico or allow other nations to in- 
tervene. There is no third choice left to 
her. That America will patiently suffer 
foreign intervention in Mexico would be 
counter to her history. Therefore it is 
reasonably certain that the Mexican 



MEXICO 77 

problem will be taken up by Washing- 
ton soon after the next general peace. 

The inconvenience suffered by Amer- 
ican citizens, the perils of their com- 
mercial intercourse, the jeopardy of 
American and foreign capital invested 
in Mexico, make it unwise and impolitic 
for the Washington Government to con- 
tinue a policy of inaction and indiffer- 
ence to Mexico. It would seem almost 
unbelievable that for years past no re- 
turn transportation can be purchased 
between the commercial capitals of 
America and Mexico. There is at a time 
of peace between the United States and 
Mexico no certainty that an American 
landed at Vera Cruz or Laredo will be 
allowed to reach Mexico City or to return 
from there. What other Government 
besides the American would so patiently 
endure such a condition of things for 
so long a period? 



78 AMERICA AFTER THE WAB 

Xow that ententes between America 
and other powers are in order, it would 
seem that a better entente between Mex- 
ico and the United States, the most de- 
sirable of all ententes for America, will 
not be much longer delayed. The con- 
struction of the Panama Canal makes it 
expedient and even imperative for the 
safety of the rapidly increasing popula- 
tion and wealth of the United States that 
the future joint foreign policy of the 
United States and Mexico should be defi- 
nitive and uniform. The protection of 
the Panama Canal against foreign ag- 
gression makes it equally imperative 
that America should come to a speedy 
understanding whereby American troops 
and munitions may be forwarded by land 
routes to Panama. Only in this way can 
"American liberty* * be effectually safe- 
guarded against the inevitable foreign 
aggressions which time in the ordinary 



MEXICO 79 

course of events will surely develop. 
After the episode of Maximilian, Ameri- 
cans have no further justification for 
believing that never again will Mexico 
be the subject of foreign attempts at 
her regeneration or even her domination. 
All history is one long record of more 
repetitions whenever similar conditions 
again develop. 



CHAPTER VI 

CANADA 

Feom President Washington's first 
administration until a comparatively re- 
cent period American public men have 
not been unmindful that permanent Eu- 
ropean domination of Canada was un- 
desirable for the United States. In the 
last century startling events have 
brought home to thoughtful Americans 
the apprehension that the territory to 
the north of them might be susceptible of 
developments which would prove hostile 
to their security and safety. The ap- 
prehension was made particularly great 
by events leading to the Mexican War, 
and again during the American Civil 

80 



CANADA 81 

War of 1861-65. The peace of America 
doubtless may be endangered by events 
in a Canada not independent. In pos- 
sible foreign complications in which 
America may be involved, unless some 
closer coalition meanwhile take place, 
Canada will be a point of danger for 
America. Happily, any disturbance due 
to such possible conditions seems at the 
moment postponed. Nevertheless, there 
are latent forces at work in the great 
Canadian problems which forbid Ameri- 
cans to remain indifferent to the fate of 
their Northern neighbor. 

Closely allied in origin, condition, and 
disposition, native Americans and the 
native British Canadians present char- 
acteristics which are markedly similar. 
A common language, as Bismarck said, 
the greatest possible bond between sepa- 
rated peoples living under different 
governments, a common jurisprudence, 



82 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

political and educational institutions not 
dissimilar except in the single Province 
of Quebec, but above all a close and al- 
most interdependent agriculture and 
commerce, all tend irresistibly to draw 
Canada and the United States together. 
With no safe winter ports of her own 
in the Atlantic basin, the economic inter- 
ests of Canada and the United States 
are in all essentials the same. 

But Canada has been far-distanced in 
national wealth and population by the 
United States. Canada remains rela- 
tively a poor state at the present time. 
The notable over-exploitation of her re- 
sources has caused the internal and the 
economic problems of Canada to come to 
be such as to compel a large and intelli- 
gent portion of her population to recog- 
nize that Canada cannot much longer re- 
main as she is. Canada must draw 
closer either to England or to the United 



CANADA 83 

States. Tradition would reconcile the 
British part of her population to the pro- 
posed scheme of " imperialistic federa- 
tion with England and her dependen- 
cies." But their personal interests dic- 
tate that Canada should draw closer to 
the United States. The prolific de- 
scendants of old French Canada would 
no longer offer a substantial resistance 
to some union with the United States. 
They perceive that their coreligionists 
have been safe under the Government of 
the United States and that their church 
is protected there, while in western Can- 
ada it meets with a marked hostility. 

The serious problem of the future of 
Canada is never very far from the 
thought of intelligent Canadians of all 
antecedents and all schools of political 
opinion. No American who has made a 
close study of the political literature and 
the state of the politics of Canada can 



84 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

fail to recognize that some speedy politi- 
cal change is now in order in Canada. 
This change will doubtless be much facil- 
itated by the present Great War. Mr. 
Bonar Law prophetically said in Decem- 
ber, 1915, " After this war the relations 
between the Dominions and the Mother 
Country can never be the same again.' ' 
This is generally recognized by Cana- 
dians. 

There have been times in the last cen- 
tury when Canada could have come 
closer to the United States with little op- 
position from England or from Cana- 
dians, but no cordial response to the 
proposal was made in America. The 
close and changing majorities of politi- 
cal parties in the United States have dis- 
inclined the average American politician 
to view with favor any near political 
union between the United States and 
Canada. If Canada were to be incor- 



CANADA 85 

porated in the United States, and the 
different Canadian Provinces were to 
become States, what would their politics 
be? This question has not been lost 
sight of by American politicians. If the 
Canadian States should all incline to one 
great political party in the United 
States, the balance of parties would be 
disturbed, and one or other great politi- 
cal party might lose power at Washing- 
ton for a very long period. This has 
been the real reason of the indifference 
of American politicians to any closer po- 
litical union between Canada and the 
United States. Forty years ago it was 
the recognition of this attitude of Ameri- 
can politicians that disinclined many 
public men in Canada to favor openly 
any movement looking to a closer politi- 
cal union between Canada and the United 
States. The average Canadian politi- 
cian was not then willing to risk his po- 



86 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

litical future in view of the cold reserve 
of the American fraternity. Yet this 
was the period in which the merger of 
Canada and the United States could 
have been most easily effected. 

But, while long quiescent, such ques- 
tions will not down in Canada. Even at 
the present moment they are being dis- 
cussed, particularly in the Province of 
Quebec, with much interest and ability. 
"Independence" or "Imperial Partner- 
ship/ ' together with the tertium gaud- 
ens, "Union with the United States,' ' 
are favorite topics with a large and im- 
portant class of polemical Canadian 
writers. In England the same topics 
are being much discussed by such writers 
as Mr. Lionel Curtis ("The Problem 
of the Commonwealth," The Macmil- 
lan Company). Singularly enough, in 
America these same subjects are re- 
ceiving scant attention in any quarter. 



CANADA 87 

The reasons for the more marked Cana- 
dian interest in these questions so im- 
portant to her future are not far to seek. 
The internal politics of Canada are, if 
anything, now in a less elevated and sat- 
isfactory state than internal politics in 
the United States. What Sir Charles 
Dilke said in 1890, "that the tone of pol- 
itics is, on the whole, higher in Canada 
than in the United States,' ' is no longer 
true. The efficiency of the governments 
of the large cities in Canada is also more 
unsatisfactory than it is in the large 
cities of the United States, where the 
municipal resources are greater. But 
above all other reasons for a certain 
manifest inquietude in Canada is the ap- 
prehension occasioned by the exploita- 
tion of the natural resources of the coun- 
try with the public funds. After the 
confederation of the Canadian Provinces 
and their quasi-independence, all the ad- 



88 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

venturers of Lombard Street seem to 
have taken up their abode in the Domin- 
ion of Canada. The expense of the pres- 
ent war to Canada bids fair to bring the 
results of this excessive exploitation to 
a speedy and accurate reckoning. The 
financial condition of Canada is, in fact, 
such that it can be saved only by the 
speedy intervention of England or the 
United States after this war shall end. 
That the financial rehabilitation of Can- 
ada should be undertaken by the United 
States alone would be more consistent 
with the policy of "America for the 
Americans.' ' It would amply repay 
either America or England to assist the 
development of Canada, for in the end 
it is destined to be a prosperous coun- 
try. 

That the projected imperial federa- 
tion, by which all the countries having 
close political relations with England 



CANADA 89 

shall be federated into one great impe- 
rial state, with England at the head, will 
be in the interest of the United States 
ought not for a moment to be admit- 
ted by Americans. Imperial federation 
would, if anything, be even less desirable 
for the United States than would be the 
independence of Canada under some neu- 
tralization guaranteed by the great Eu- 
ropean powers. It ought to be of pro- 
found interest to the people of the United 
States that either the independence of 
Canada or its absorption in some great 
scheme of British imperial federation is 
destined to come about very speedily af- 
ter the present war. That it is so des- 
tined is now generally admitted both in 
Canada and in England. If the present 
war produces no other changes in the 
British Empire, it is at least certain to 
produce some change in the international 
status of Canada, 



90 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

If Canada should become actually sov- 
ereign and independent, — and this is a 
consummation not only in the interest of 
the Canadians themselves, but the best 
solution for the United States, — any 
guaranty of the neutralization of the 
new power by European powers would 
be most undesirable for the United 
States. With an absolutely independ- 
ent Canada commercial treaties and 
some definitive offensive and defensive 
alliance could be made by the United 
States. It would be highly necessary 
for the United States that the arrange- 
ments be made speedily. They would 
not at first be rejected by an independ- 
ent Canada, for her foreign relations 
would be on the same plane as those of 
the United States, while the United 
States would furnish to Canada her nat- 
ural or primary markets. 

The " Imperial Federation League,' ' 



CANADA 91 

the program of which imports the po- 
litical, military, and economic reorgani- 
zation of the entire British Empire, was 
founded in the year 1884. Ever since, 
with varying fortunes and support, the 
project has continued to grow. With 
the close of the present war the nego- 
tiations for federation will be ripe for 
consummation. In any such reorganiza- 
tion of the British Empire, Canada, from 
its geographical position, will necessarily 
have a leading place. Canada is much 
nearer to both Europe and Asia than is 
the United States. As early as 1764 it 
was suggested by Thomas Pownall, one 
of the very few able administrators up 
to that time sent by England to the 
North American colonies, that the seat 
of Government of the British Empire 
should be transferred to America. This 
premature suggestion long afterward 
attracted the attention of Mr. Gladstone, 



92 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

who considered it highly interesting. 
Portugal acted on Pownall's suggestion 
and transferred its dynasty to its Bra- 
zilian Empire. With the inevitable al- 
terations in the diffusion and extent of 
the population of the British Empire, 
it is not impossible that the project of 
Pownall may some day be revived. But 
whether revived or dismissed, imperial 
federation will necessarily alter essen- 
tially the entire military program of the 
British Empire. Imperial arsenals, 
dockyards, and fortifications in Canada 
would become inevitable. That they 
would excite the lively apprehensions of 
Americans there can be no justifica- 
tion for doubting. Imperial federation 
would, indeed, be little less menacing to 
the permanent peace of America than 
the independence and neutralization of 
Canada under some guaranty of the 
great European powers. Imperial fed- 



CANADA 93 

eration would permanently intrude Eu- 
ropean questions into the foreign poli- 
cies of America. Canada would then 
necessarily become a participant in 
every European, Asiatic, and African 
problem of the federated empire. 

That a speedy change of some kind in 
the political status of Canada is under 
way is apparent not only from the pub- 
lic utterances of Mr. Bonar Law and the 
imperialists in Canada and England, 
but from the Canadian evolutions of the 
last fifty years. The official construc- 
tion of the Canadian militia laws in 1855, 
1862, 1868, 1883, 1899, and 1904; the 
English colonial conferences of 1887, 
1902, and 1907 ; the Canadian naval pro- 
gram of 1910 in aid of Great Britain — 
none of all these things has received the 
attention in the United States which its 
importance to them deserves. Proud of 
its inherent strength, America has re- 



94 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

mained strangely indifferent to a pro- 
gram which some day is destined to move 
it profoundly. 

There is in Canada an important part 
of the population who favor absolute in- 
dependence of Great Britain. These 
"nationalists," as they term themselves, 
think that a self-governing state ought 
not to be dependent or subordinate in 
any respect. It should be free to control 
its own destiny. The nationalists argue 
that it is to the interest of Canada to 
control its own policies and foreign re- 
lations, and that Canada can fulfil its 
high destiny only by entering the family 
of nations as a completely sovereign 
state. If the absolute independence of 
Canada should ever be realized, it prob- 
ably would be the best solution of the 
Canadian problem for the United States. 
The territory now embraced in the 
United States is already so extended that 



CANADA 95 

its proper and efficient government is 
not free from difficulties. To enlarge 
the number of States of the Union any 
further would not diminish its problems 
or promote the more efficient govern- 
ment of the United States, while it might 
menace the permanency of the Union. 
With an independent republic of Can- 
ada relations could easily be established 
which would increase the safety and the 
prosperity of both Canada and the 
United States. Canada, from its extent 
and the character of its population, is 
naturally a democracy and likely to 
remain such. The United States, if well 
governed, is likely to continue indefi- 
nitely a republic. Monarchical institu- 
tions do not and cannot flourish in such 
countries as Canada and the United 
States unless artificially fostered. 

On the other hand, some kind of union 
of Canada and the United States would 



96 AMEEICA AFTER THE WAR 

much simplify the collection of revenue 
under the protective system, as well as 
the plans for the defensive warfare of 
both countries. Closely allied, the two 
countries would be in an insular posi- 
tion, separated from the rest of the 
world by vast seas. With a great navy 
and a moderate standing army, the two 
countries combined could resist the ag- 
gression of the entire world. Probably 
the desirable results indicated could be 
attained without political union if Can- 
ada were an independent state and in a 
position to enter a league of the repub- 
lics of North America. The British 
scheme of imperial federation would 
frustrate any such desirable league. 

That between Canadians and Ameri- 
cans there is at present the most friendly 
feeling is a fact the value of which can- 
not be overestimated. That a period of 
general good feeling should be availed 



CANADA 97 

of to place both nations in a position 
reciprocally advantageous is evident. 
The common problems for the two coun- 
tries are of more importance to them 
than any other, and their proper solu- 
tion will call for a high order of states- 
manship in both Canada and the United 
States. With Europe both Canada and 
the United States have minor interests, 
but with each other their interests are 
reciprocal and of paramount impor- 
tance. 

After the present World War is at an 
end the problem of adequate labor for 
Canada is likely to become acute. There 
is at all times insufficient labor in Can- 
ada. Ever since the day of Sir Alexan- 
der Gait, an able Canadian, schemes 
for the increase of labor have formed a 
part of Canadian policy. One of the 
most powerful Canadian arguments 
against conscription at the present time 



98 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

is that it will stifle European emigration 
to Canada. Deprived of immigration 
for a long period, suggestions of Indian 
and coolie labor will fall no longer on 
unwilling ears in Canada. Under im- 
perial federation the hitherto insoluble 
problem for the British Government con- 
cerning the disposition of the surplus 
labor of India would tend to make its in- 
troduction into Canada reasonable cer- 
tain. That such a policy would be ac- 
tively resented in the United States is 
not doubtful. The Asiatic problem is in 
the United States fundamentally and 
primarily a labor problem. If Asiatic 
laborers should swarm in either Canada 
or Mexico, they could not long be kept 
out of the United States. This is only 
one additional reason why the problems 
of Canada should continue to interest 
the people of the United States. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE WEST INDIES 

The group of islands between Florida 
and South America are collectively des- 
ignated, in common parlance, the West 
Indies. These islands are all directly 
within the proper sphere of American 
influence and not within the proper 
sphere of influence of Europe. In all 
these islands America has a most direct 
interest that they shall not be utilized as 
the future bases of hostilities directed 
against either North or South America. 
As the islands lie directly in the trade 
routes of the American hemisphere, 
it cannot be claimed with justice that 
either Europe or Asia has an equal com- 



100 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

mercial interest in them. American in- 
terests of all kinds in the West Indies are 
plainly paramount to the interests of all 
other powers. Consequently most of the 
larger islands in the West Indies have 
already passed under the control of 
America, and the rest in course of due 
time bid fair to follow. 

Any examination of the personal in- 
terests of the West Indian Islands will 
disclose that economic influences prompt 
them to seek incorporation with Amer- 
ica. In those of the islands which have 
already come under American domina- 
tion the agricultural and other island 
resources quickly revived, whereas un- 
der European domination they lan- 
guished or disappeared. In the process 
of extinguishing the proprietorship of 
Europe in the West Indies all the eco- 
nomic conditions are aiding America. 
The islands of the Atlantic stand in a 



THE WEST INDIES 101 

peculiarly close relation to America. 
America has no colonial possessions on 
the mainland of Europe, Africa, and 
Asia, and it would be highly impolitic 
for her to accept any colonial juris- 
diction in any part of Europe, Africa, 
or on the mainland of Asia. If terri- 
tories in those quarters of the world were 
presented to her, it would be the act 
of the enemies rather than the act of the 
friends of America. In all the Ameri- 
cas and their adjacent seas lie all the best 
interests of America. The West Indies 
are directly within the American sphere 
of interest. 

The islands of the Pacific other than 
those belonging to the great powers, in- 
cluding Japan, do not occupy the same 
relation to America as the Asiatic main- 
land. America has already acquired 
large and important island possessions 
in the Pacific, and her tenure of these is 



102 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

morally superior to that of any of the 
other great powers exclusive of China 
and Japan. As one of the leading coun- 
tries bordering on the Pacific Ocean, 
America has the most direct concern in 
the islands of the Pacific. The economic 
interests of the rapidly developing por- 
tion of the United States lying west of 
the Rocky Mountains in the trade of the 
Pacific are already so extensive that the 
general Government cannot ignore them. 
The Pacific States of America would not 
long tolerate governmental indifference 
to their paramount interests. The trade 
and commerce of the Pacific are most 
important for the long future of the 
Western United States. The proxim- 
ity of the cities of San Diego, Los An- 
geles, San Francisco, Portland, Tacoma, 
and Seattle to the Pacific Ocean tends to 
develop certain characteristics peculiar 
to all the Pacific. The trade intercourse 



THE WEST INDIES 103 

between the Atlantic States of America 
and the West Indies creates a very close 
bond. 

The facilities of intercourse between 
countries bordering on the same seas 
always create common interests in all 
the peoples of the seaboard districts. 
Their daily intercourse tends to produce 
a certain uniformity of temperament, 
manners, and culture in the populations 
of coast towns lying on the same seas 
without much regard to their respective 
nationalities. All the peoples living on 
the Mediterranean show marked similar- 
ities, and to acute observers they are dis- 
tinguishable from their countrymen liv- 
ing remote from the Mediterranean. 
So the peoples living on the sea coast of 
the North Atlantic basin are much in- 
fluenced by certain common forces not 
felt by their countrymen of the interior. 
The inhabitants of New York and Boston 



104 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

are, for instance, in closer touch with the 
thought and interests of London and 
Bordeaux than are the inhabitants of 
the cities in the middle States of Amer- 
ica. It is obvious that the thought of 
London, New York, and Boston is 
greatly affected by common interests and 
by the facility of their intercourse by 
sea. Daily and hourly the ships come 
and go between them with peculiar mes- 
sages for themselves only. In the great 
towns of middle America the thought of 
London or Bordeaux has little or no di- 
rect influence. 

The immense mass and weight of 
America are already exercising an irre- 
sistible force in attracting the West In- 
dies to it. As President John Adams 
said, ' ' There are laws of political as well 
as of physical gravitation. ' ' This force 
is now almost irresistible in the West In- 
dies. It has been sought in vain to coun- 



THE WEST INDIES 105 

teract it by subsidies to the islands from 
European governments or by the spe- 
cial privileges called reciprocities. Not- 
withstanding these encouragements, the 
trade of the West Indies continues to 
seek its natural American channels. 
This invariable tendency of trade is ob- 
servable even in the distant North At- 
lantic island of Bermuda, where the flag 
alone continues British, and this only be- 
cause the flagstaff is of good English 
oak. 

Except as coaling ports and dockyards 
the West Indies are now of very little 
importance to the European powers. 
From the economic point of view the 
West Indian Islands still retained by 
Europe are positively disadvantageous 
to Europeans, and their longer reten- 
tion is prompted only by motives of am- 
bition or sentiment. That the European 
powers could continue to hold their West 



106 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

Indian possessions during a war with 
America is unlikely. It would be an 
indication of friendliness on the part of 
Europe to follow the example of Den- 
mark and cede all the West Indies to 
America. Their usefulness to Europe 
as coaling stations will cease with scien- 
tific changes in the nature of the meth- 
ods of propulsion, and as dockyards their 
importance will decrease with the in- 
creasing radius of commercial vessels. 
Any necessary European user of the 
islands could be better provided for by 
stipulation in the acts of cession to the 
United States. 

Owing to its fertility, its temperate 
climate, and the abundance of its food 
supply, the population of America is 
bound to increase with leaps and bounds 
after the war. The United States is 
more than half as large as China and 
Europe combined, and yet its continental 



THE WEST INDIES 107 

population is only about a hundred mil- 
lions at present. It will in time readily 
support and maintain more than seven 
hundred millions. That it is destined to 
be densely populated and highly devel- 
oped is certain. When America is in the 
condition of Europe as regards density 
of population and internal development, 
the West Indies will belong exclusively 
to America. The Caribbean Sea and the 
Gulf of Mexico will be what they now 
are, the American Mediterranean, but 
with this difference : they will be, as they 
should be, exclusively under American 
domination. 

In the general peace to follow the pres- 
ent World War the Entente statesmen 
could do much toward the better defini- 
tion and limitation of the American 
spheres of influence in the West Indies. 
That they will not neglect this Ameri- 
cans feel confident, despite unofficial dis- 



108 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

claimers that no advantage whatever for 
America is sought by the war. It would 
be detrimental to Americans if the pub- 
lic authorities should neglect the real in- 
terests of America at a time when the 
foreign powers are in the mood to make 
concessions of things of no value to them 
from any point of view. If the Euro- 
pean powers attached any real value to 
their empty titles of sovereignty in the 
West Indies, the case would be differ- 
ent. The continuation of Europe in the 
West Indies can have no adequate moral 
foundation, while it is, and ought to be, 
displeasing to America. 

By reason of the mere cooperation of 
America with England in the present 
Great War England's precarious tenure 
of her widely extended empire has al- 
ready been assured for an indefinite pe- 
riod beyond her reasonable hopes. If 
England does not recognize this fact, her 



THE WEST INDIES 109 

statesmen do, and it is her statesmen 
who control the immediate future of the 
British West Indies. That the peace 
negotiations could be made the means of 
transferring Jamaica and Nassau, for 
example, from England to America is 
not doubtful if English statesmen are 
willing to consent. They certainly will 
not consent if they are not asked by 
America to make the cession. 

When America is as densely popu- 
lated as its resources and situation prom- 
ise, the now potential resources of the 
West Indies will not fail to be utilized on 
the mainland. With la petite culture, or 
intensive cultivation by small proprie- 
tors, the production of food in the West 
Indies may be made almost unlimited. 
Charles Kingsley, in his charming 
sketch of the West Indies, fifty years 
ago, pointed out that the same space of 
ground in the West Indies is capable of 



110 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

producing 133 times the amount of food 
producible in the wheat-growing areas of 
America. The food supply of a na- 
tion in the last analysis is the funda- 
mental purpose of government. With- 
out an abundance of food the progress 
of a nation is seriously hampered. Its 
limit of development is determined only 
by the limitation of its own natural food- 
giving areas. A nation dependent on 
another nation for food is at all times 
in a more or less dangerous position. 
That the United States will not in the 
end be indifferent to the food areas of 
the West Indies is certain. 

The completion of the Panama Canal 
by the United States and the importance 
to America of keeping it open at all times 
for the coastwise commerce of the United 
States give a new strategic importance 
to the possession of the West Indies by 
the United States. In the possession of 



THE WEST INDIES 111 

a European power the West Indian Is- 
lands are a menace to the peace of Amer- 
ica. They can be retained by Europe 
only with some latent design hostile to 
America. In a war exclusively between 
European or Asiatic powers their cus- 
tody has only some remote significance. 
The retention of the West Indies by Eu- 
rope because it promotes its world com- 
merce would justify its possession of the 
shores of all parts of the world. It is 
an argument the validity of which can- 
not be admitted in America. World 
commerce in the end must be regulated 
by a superior and binding law of na- 
tions and not by hostile and armed cita- 
dels seated in foreign countries or at 
points immediately adjacent to them. 



CHAPTER VIII 

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 

That the present Great War and its 
solutions will have a lasting effect on the 
future of Asia and the Pacific Ocean as 
an international highway is clearly dis- 
cerned by the leading eastern Asiatic 
powers. Both have therefore prepared 
for representation in the final peace 
council. The late action of China is 
peculiarly significant. It nominally en- 
tered the war in order to safeguard its 
national future. China was unwilling 
that its interests in the peace conference 
should be abandoned to the great Eu- 
ropean powers. China is a belligerent 
because it does not intend that the final 
112 



ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 113 

decisions of the peace conference in re- 
gard to the future of the Orient shall 
go by default. In this action Chinese 
statesmen have acted astutely. The 
time has doubtless come for China to cry 
halt to European aggressions. These 
aggressions have gone further than is 
consistent with the interests of America. 
America has a supreme interest in East- 
ern Asia, the "open door." The suc- 
cess of the "open-door" policy demands 
that eastern Asia, in common with the 
rest of the world, shall be left to govern 
itself consistently with the general law 
of nations. The abstract right of the 
Chinese to govern themselves can no 
longer be ignored. As an American doc- 
trine it is rapidly coming to the fore. 
The right of the Chinese to govern them- 
selves is as well founded as the right of 
Americans to govern themselves, and by 
Americans it cannot be safely chal- 



114 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

lenged. The American Government at 
Washington has been theoretically con- 
sistent in upholding the plea of "Asia 
for the Asiatics"; but it has lacked the 
power and will to enforce either the in- 
tegrity of China or the " open-door' ' 
policy. 

The ' ' open-door ' ' policy was first pro- 
nounced by the American secretary of 
state, John Hay, in 1899. The "open 
door' graphically prefigures little more 
than equal commercial opportunities for 
all foreigners, including Americans, in 
China and its dependencies or provinces. 
The doctrine of the "open door" is un- 
fortunately much complicated by rail- 
way and other concessions granted by 
China to Europe. These cessions have 
diminished the sovereignty of China 
throughout extensive provinces of its 
empire. But the most formidable ob- 
stacles to the "open door" are the ex- 



ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 115 

elusive territorial ambitions of both Rus- 
sia and Japan, not opposed by England 
or France. The Russians and the Japa- 
nese have virtually closed the "open 
door" in Mongolia and Manchuria. 
Their action is regarded in the Orient 
as fatal to the American plan of the 
"open door." Wherever Japan or 
Russia has encroached on Chinese ter- 
ritory the door is no longer left wide 
open. 

The particular pretensions in China 
of Japan and Russia have hitherto been 
consistently supported by England and 
France of the present Entente powers 
without great regard for the American 
"open-door" policy. The history of 
Manchuria and the Chinchow-Aigun 
railway project would alone demonstrate 
the accuracy of this statement. It 
therefore becomes a serious problem for 
America, where, if anywhere, she is to 



116 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

look for an ally if she ever concludes to 
enforce her "open-door" policy in the 
Orient. If America concludes that she 
must enforce the "open door" by her- 
self, and the time is fast approaching 
when the great States lying west of the 
Rocky Mountains will insist on some sort 
of Federal action about the "open 
door," it is evident that the military 
strength of America after the present 
war must be maintained even when it 
shall be placed on a peace footing. 
Otherwise America will be in a very ex- 
posed situation. Japan has promised 
to return to China after the war the 
territory of Kiao-chau, leased to Ger- 
many by China and now held by Japan. 
If the German protectorate is not so re- 
turned after the war, what is to be the 
sequence and significance of the refusal? 
Kiao-chau is a minor matter. Amer- 
ica is one of the great powers having di- 



ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 117 

rect interests in the Pacific Ocean. With 
the exception of China and Japan, no 
other power has such extensive interests 
in the highways of the Pacific as Amer- 
ica. The Pacific furnishes the western 
boundary of the United States, and the 
greater trade of the vast region of 
America lying west of the Eocky Moun- 
tains will sooner or later be over the 
Pacific with the Orient. The territorial 
interests of England and France in 
China are not comparable with those of 
America. The real interests of England 
and France are in southern Asia and in 
the southern Pacific. How America is 
to safeguard effectually its particular 
interests in China and the Pacific is des- 
tined to be one of the greatest problems 
for American statesmen. 

It is obvious that the proper foreign 
policy of America turns upon two great 
principles, the Monroe Doctrine and the 



118 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

' ' open door. ' ' The practical application 
of the Monroe Doctrine is confined to the 
Western Hemisphere; the "open door" 
to the Eastern. Unless America is pre- 
pared to enforce both, it would have been 
more conducive to the peace of America 
had they never been formulated. The 
safety and the prosperity of America 
are, however, so intimately concerned 
with both policies that they cannot be 
abandoned. Therefore America must 
be prepared to enforce them whenever 
they are flagrantly assailed, or America 
will lose its rightful place as a great 
power. 

America has become a great nation by 
reason of its natural resources, its con- 
stantly augmenting population, and its 
ever-growing commerce. The natural 
resources will cease to be developed, the 
population and the commerce of the 



ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 119 

country will cease to grow, if neglected 
by the Government at Washington ; they 
require an intelligent and an energetic 
national policy for their proper conser- 
vation. American merchants are free to 
seek the protection of any more power- 
ful government, and if America neglects 
its own merchants, they will seek a more 
splendid flag. American commerce will 
inevitably follow her merchants. It is 
essential, therefore, that the foreign 
policy of the United States shall be made 
to measure up to its responsibilities if 
the country is to continue permanently 
successful and powerful. Unless a na- 
tion cooperates closely with its mer- 
chants and fosters their foreign com- 
merce by every legitimate means in its 
power, national prosperity will surely 
cease, and political decadence follow. 
There can be no successful domestic com- 



120 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

merce in a country where the foreign 
commerce is not intelligently promoted 
by the Government. 

The acquisition of the islands of the 
Pacific now under American dominion 
was pursuant to the best national policy. 
Hawaii, Samoa, Guam, and the Philip- 
pines are not only important points of 
call, but important protected refuges 
for American shipping in the Pacific. 
The retention by America of these 
islands does not violate the principle of 
"Asia for the Asiatics.' ' None of them 
was acquired from an Asiatic power. 
America is a co-owner of the shores of 
the Pacific, and one of the largest. In 
the distant future its commerce on the 
Pacific will far surpass in importance 
to America that of the Atlantic side. 
The future of American commerce for- 
bids America to neglect or to abandon its 
rightfully acquired island possessions in 



ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 121 

the Pacific. No European power, indeed 
no Asiatic power, questions the right of 
America to the Pacific islands which 
have passed under its flag. It holds 
them by a completely valid title, and it 
must not part with them, or it will be 
false to its trust and to the future good 
of the American nation. 

America, unlike England, has never 
sought territorial possessions remote 
from its proper shores. Every acquisi- 
tion of outlying lands has had direct ref- 
erence to the proper sphere of Ameri- 
can influence and to the immediate in- 
terests of its domestic territories. Had 
the Philippines been owned by China or 
Japan, America would not have acquired 
them. They were ceded to America by 
a European power in deference to the 
superior interests of America in the 
trade of the Pacific. America, unlike 
the European powers, has never sought 



122 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

any territory or " sphere of influence" 
on the Asiatic mainland. The Ameri- 
can title to the Philippines is not deroga- 
tory to any Asiatic power. The islands 
are rightfully American and they are a 
tremendous and natural auxiliary to the 
long future of the rich trade between 
Asia and America. If the Philippines 
are abandoned by America, the descent 
of America into the ranks of the de- 
cadent and nerveless powers will be 
rapid and certain. Asia is not im- 
pressed by a foreign power which ex- 
hibits neither strength nor consistency, 
for Asiatics are quick to realize that 
without these qualities no nation can be 
either successful or permanent. 



CHAPTER IX 

AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

After the present war the conditions 
of the world will be greatly changed, and 
America can never again be quite the 
same. The isolation of America will 
have ended ; its relations to foreign pow- 
ers will be reversed. But the value of 
its alliance with France, England, Italy, 
and Japan and " preparedness" will for 
a long period be worth to America all 
they have cost, and the cost has been al- 
ready prodigious. The internal prob- 
lems of America after the war will not 
be diminished. Only a few of the prob- 
lems, foreign and domestic, have been 
noticed in the preceding pages. There 

123 



124 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

are many others. By means of the war 
it will have become evident to Americans 
that a very prosperous nation, with an 
extended and exposed territory, cannot 
safely be left longer undefended, and 
that the future measures for the defense 
of the country must be more commensu- 
rate with its dangers and the national 
potentiality. Americans will not here- 
after rely on the isolated position of 
America, nor will they easily resume 
their former policy of trusting the de- 
fense of the country wholly to chance. 
If they do, they will in the end suffer un- 
told miseries, and the prosperity of 
America will vanish as quickly as it ap- 
peared. 

Not only must the American be made 
a more efficient government from every 
point of view, but it must be kept effi- 
cient. America can never again, after 
this war, safely return to its indiffer- 



AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 125 

ence to the military situation of the 
country. It has chosen to assert itself 
as a great power in the world, and it 
must recognize the responsibilities and 
the risks which the assertion involved, or 
it will fall as other weak countries have 
always fallen. ; There is now no inter- 
mediate choice for Americans. They 
must be up and onward or fall to pieces. 
■In the future America must be made 
able to stand by itself ; it can safely trust 
to the permanency of no alliance ; it must 
be prepared at all cost to resist aggres- 
sion from any and every quarter. To do 
this it must be kept a strong as well as 
a rich nation. The enmities and the 
jealousies created by the present war 
will not subside for a century. If they 
should, a rich nation, helpless and unpre- 
pared to defend itself, is certain, when a 
good opportunity offers, to be attacked. 
A nation with the sharp enmities ere- 



126 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

ated by American policies is in a par- 
ticularly dangerous situation. Only by 
remaining prepared can America hope 
to escape unscathed. 

The methods thus far characteristic 
of American democracy are not condu- 
cive to the permanent peace of America. 
The constant rotation in office, which is a 
principle of democracy, often brings into 
power men not trained in either state- 
craft or diplomacy. Many of the suc- 
cessful lawyers and the prominent poli- 
ticians promoted to high office at Wash- 
ington are not profoundly trained in the 
art of government. Some of them have 
little familiarity with even the foreign 
relations of America, while only a few of 
them are deeply versed in the finer art 
of diplomacy. Such things are not 
easily acquired by men not in public life ; 
they require a lifelong training. 

The rest of the world asserts that the 



AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 127 

foreign policy of America has been char- 
acterized by a certain abrupt directness 
which is inconsistent with the usages of 
diplomacy and is unnecessarily disturb- 
ing to the peace of the world. The di- 
rectness of American diplomacy is too 
often mistaken by foreign states for 
either menace or a sign of unfriendli- 
ness. When it is mistaken for menace, 
America is left in a very unsafe position 
unless prepared for sudden attack. It 
does not diminish the danger to plead 
that the "directness" of America in dip- 
lomatic negotiations is not intended to 
be minatory or unfriendly, or that 
American diplomacy is only one phase of 
a government in which the people rule. 
The necessity that American diplomats 
shall not disregard "popular opinion" 
doubtless too often obligates them to a 
sort of spectacular diplomacy which is 
certainly not consistent with diplomatic 



128 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

usage as hitherto understood. The ex- 
igencies of politics in America often re- 
quire an administration to submit its 
foreign policies at every stage to the 
people, although the electors themselves 
have no settled foreign policy upon 
which the administration and its diplo- 
matic corps can rely. Perhaps the 
greatest disadvantage of democracy as 
a principle of government is observable 
in the history of American foreign rela- 
tions. There is in America no such 
thing as a settled foreign policy binding 
on successive administrations. This is 
not so in France or England. The de- 
fect can be corrected only by greater loy- 
alty of Americans to constituted au- 
thority and by a deeper popular convic- 
tion, gleaned from hard experience, that 
matters of foreign policy should proceed 
on a settled and permanent principle 
which must be determined by competent 



AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 129 

governmental agents trained in the art 
of diplomacy. 

The accusation of the world that 
American diplomacy too frequently ex- 
hibits an unfriendly attitude which is not 
sufficiently conciliatory is in part due to 
the unusual frankness characteristic of 
American diplomacy. To be effectual, 
diplomacy must be reticent. Much of 
the information imputed to diplomats 
should, if repeated, be confined to the 
archives of the State Department. The 
English foreign minister, Mr. Balfour, 
in August, 1917, lucidly and satisfac- 
torily explained to Parliament the real 
reasons for diplomatic reticence. His 
explanation must have been very dis- 
quieting to some diplomats in America. 
Not only should diplomacy be reticent, 
but it should be stately. European di- 
plomacy has been built up on a policy 
of compromise, facilitated by a distin- 



130 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

guished conciliation and marked official 
politeness. The diction of diplomatic 
intercourse should at all times be one of 
extreme civility. The use of the term 
' ' demand' ' in international negotiations 
is, for example, equivalent in European 
diplomacy to hostilities. In American 
diplomacy the term "demand" has not 
had the same significance. It has been 
used on several occasions with very awk- 
ward results. Doubtless America has 
occasionally had diplomats of excep- 
tional ability, but it has had more of in- 
adequate attainment. If America is to 
continue to pursue its past diplomatic 
methods, it should have a greater force 
always behind it. The Japanese states- 
man Count Okuma is reported to have 
said in 1915, "Diplomacy, to be really 
effective and successful, must be backed 
up by sufficient national strength." 
The directness and the exigencies of 



AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 131 

American diplomacy make it particu- 
larly necessary that America should be 
prepared for hostile eventualities. 
/The proper conservation of all the ele- 
ments of a nation's strength is a prime 
duty of a great government. When a 
nation's territory is so situated that it 
has an extensive coast bordering on the 
open seas and a large population dwell- 
ing on the seaboard, and yet the nation 
has no commercial marine and no seafar- 
ing men, there is evidently something 
awry in the governmental policies or 
some omission on the part of the govern- 
ment. ; After the present war America 
will in all probability be reinstated in 
the leading position which it once held 
on the high seas. It is now becoming 
apparent in America that it is not good 
policy to abandon transportation of 
American commerce to foreigners. 
Americans at last begin to see, also, that 



132 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

a commercial marine is an important 
auxiliary in waging successful warfare, 
defensive or offensive. Had America in 
1914 possessed a great mercantile ma- 
rine and an adequate armed force, the 
.entire course of the general war in Eu- 
rope would have been different. That 
America should in the future maintain a 
mercantile marine has already become a 
common conviction in the American 
coast towns. It is to be hoped that this 
conviction will become general^ 

The building up of a commercial ma- 
rine will be one of the after-war prob- 
lems; but the greatest of all such prob- 
lems will be " preparedness.' ' In a de- 
mocracy preparedness meets with an 
opposition not tolerated in states exist- 
ing under more centralized forms of gov- 
ernment. Before discussing the prob- 
lems of the American commercial marine 
and " preparedness," it will be best to 



AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 133 

consider the characteristics of American 
democracy, for they affect both prepar- 
edness and the commercial marine of 
America. 



CHAPTER X 

DEMOCRACY 

In the course of the polemics of the 
pending war, Democracy has been much 
emphasized by the politicians. Democ- 
racy, as a principle of government, has 
the defects of its virtues. In ancient 
times it was thought to be fatal to free- 
dom. In modern times it is generally 
believed to promote freedom and liberty, 
but to fail in efficiency. That it is nec- 
essarily inefficient, old-fashioned native 
Americans deny. It is by no means cer- 
tain that a democratic republic cannot be 
made equal to all the exigencies of na- 
tional life. It is, however, the fact that 
to Americans of the old school, democ- 

134 



DEMOCRACY 135 

racy means something quite different 
from the rampant kinds of democracy 
which many politicians of the present 
day applaud. 

At the foundation of the general Gov- 
ernment of the United States " democ- 
racy' ' stood for a popular government 
of an ordered and highly conservative 
kind. To Americans of the old school, 
democracy, in a glorified sense, conse- 
quently became almost the equivalent of 
civil liberty. Such Americans are confi- 
dent that popular judgment in the end 
will sustain civil liberty and order and 
refrain from excesses. This is the prob- 
lem. Will it? Unfortunately, there is 
a new theory of democracy coming up in 
America, a theory which some modern 
politicians would carry to extremes. If 
this new school were to triumph, we 
should have a weak and spasmodic form 
of democracy, with a government badly 



136 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

adapted to times of stress and confusion. 
Thus far in its history the United States 
has proved to the world that a demo- 
cratic republic may be highly efficient 
and powerful even in times of war. The 
new school of democracy deprecates any 
efficiency for war, and in this respect 
their departure from a historic creed 
separates them from the American dem- 
ocrats of the old school. President Wil- 
son has recently showed that he has no 
lasting sympathy with the new school 
and that he favors a militant democracy 
of the historic type. It is to be hoped 
that his present conviction will not again 
change after peace ensues. 

Let us inquire what modern Ameri- 
cans really mean by democracy. De- 
mocracy has been denned by Mr. Bal- 
four as a government in which the ulti- 
mate control lies with the people. It is 
obvious that Mr. Balfour's definition is* 



DEMOCRACY 137 

wide enough to embrace a great many 
forms of government other than repub- 
lics. In political theory the ultimate 
control lies with the people in many 
European kingdoms; but in England 
above its democracy, is a great political 
aristocracy which, disguise it as we may, 
arrogates to itself in some way the su- 
preme and perpetual direction of the 
Government. To some modern Ameri- 
cans the Government of England is 
therefore not a pure democracy. What 
most Americans mean by democracy is 
a government where there are no class 
distinctions and where the people rule 
not ultimately, but primarily and all the 
time. Such was the Jeffersonian con- 
ception of American democracy. With 
a simple and homogeneous people such 
as Americans were at the inception of 
the republic, that form of democracy 
worked admirably. As the nation has 



138 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

grown more complex, the art of govern- 
ment on the principles of democracy has 
become difficult, and it is less certain 
that a government in which the people 
rule all the time is efficient enough to 
weather the perils which beset nations. 
What many Americans prize most in 
their democracy is not, however, the effi- 
ciency it produces, but the kind of care- 
less and unrestrained liberty which they 
associate with their own form of democ- 
racy. Of the inestimable value of per- 
fect, ordered liberty there can be no 
question. The trouble is that perfect, 
ordered liberty cannot always be pro- 
tected or even maintained without an 
efficient government. Thus the pro- 
found problem for American democracy 
is, Can democracy organize and main- 
tain a government sufficiently efficient to 
assure and protect ordered liberty per- 
manently? Old-fashioned conservative 



DEMOCRACY 139 

Americans believe that in time democ- 
racy can do this. They, however, rarely 
philosophize about their democracy; 
they accept it as a perfectly natural and 
stable institution for a great state. 
This is a favorable sign, for to be great, 
a state must be strong and well ordered. 
To the more than fifty millions of na- 
tive Americans whose progenitors vol- 
untarily severed their connections with 
Europe nearly three centuries ago, de- 
mocracy is not so much a political creed 
as a mental habit. They were born dem- 
ocrats and know nothing else. As 
Henry Clay said, "Monarchy in the 
American Colonies before the Revolu- 
tion was only a theory." America was 
of necessity essentially a democracy 
from the very beginning. Of aristo- 
cratic or monarchical institutions co- 
lonial Americans had no actual experi- 
ence. With privilege and recognized 



140 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

distinctions of rank they were totally un- 
familiar. It is significant that present- 
day Americans remain indifferent to all 
titles except the military. In America 
even the signs of authority are rarely 
visible. With the machinery of their 
own form of government most Ameri- 
cans rarely come into contact. They 
vote at stated times, and they take a 
more or less active or passive interest in 
the preliminaries which lead to popular 
elections for public office; but never 
through their entire life do most of them 
come in contact with the high officials of 
their general Government. In large 
portions of America even the police, in 
other countries the most familiar agents 
of governmental authority, are un- 
known. Yet all Americans are dimly 
aware that a great governmental struc- 
ture exists at Washington, and that at 
times it exerts a tremendous power, 



DEMOCRACY 141 

which on the whole they believe is work- 
ing for the good of the country at large. 
Only in some vague way do they associ- 
ate their prosperity and the actual free- 
dom they enjoy with democracy. 

Up to this point of their history it 
has not been indispensable for Ameri- 
cans to inquire whether or not democ- 
racy is the best principle for their coun- 
try. Let the Government alter ma- 
terially its relations to the governed, let 
the nation be utterly vanquished by a 
foreign enemy, or let a long period of re- 
tarded development intervene, and the 
spirit of inquiry concerning the merits 
of democracy would be easily aroused in 
America. That the examination would 
be thorough there is good reason to be- 
lieve, for the general intelligence of the 
people of the country is singularly alert 
when interest and necessity demand final 
and serious public action. 



142 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

With all its advantages democracy, 
like all other human institutions, is not 
without its peculiar defects. It is con- 
ceded to be inefficient in particulars 
where more centralized governments are 
efficient. As Mr. Balfour has lately re- 
marked, democracies require a very 
high order of statesmanship to guide 
them successfully. The main defect of 
democracies is that they are apt to give 
rise to a large political class. Democ- 
racies generally are a paradise for petty 
politicians. In modern America the 
professional politicians stand almost 
apart from the excellent and industrious 
citizens of the country. It is generally 
admitted that as a rule they do not 
as a body now compare favorably with 
Americans in other vocations. Of 
course there are exceptions to this rule. 
A politician is not necessarily a dema- 
gogue or a corrupt man; but with a 



DEMOCRACY 143 

formidable part of the American poli- 
ticians politics is a sort of science of de- 
mocracy which they pervert for their 
own purposes. A breach of a private 
trust is always deplorable and it is gen- 
erally condemned. When politicians do 
not consider the welfare of the state or 
of the country, but the advantage of pub- 
lic measures to themselves or their 
party, it is a breach of a public trust. 
A breach of a public trust is the most 
serious offense which can be committed 
against human society. Yet among pol- 
iticians this offense is not uncommon, 
and by the public it is often too freely 
condoned. 

It is fortunate that the most eminent 
public men of America are not its pro- 
fessional politicians. They are those 
whose mastery of the science of govern- 
ment segregates them from the regular 
politicians of the country. By sheer 



144 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

force of intellectual eminence a few pub- 
lic men have won in America a recog- 
nized place in the national councils. 
Without such men the condition of pub- 
lic affairs would be hopeless indeed. 
Fortunately, Americans do not ignore 
the distinction between their politicians 
and their statesmen. They honor their 
statesmen and distrust their politicians. 
The term "democracy" seems lately 
to have become in the public discourse 
of the politicians the equivalent of the 
term "republic," and yet the terms are 
far from being equivalents. A republic 
may exist without democracy, and de- 
mocracy without a republic. To a re- 
publican form of government, Americans, 
from the first settlements of North 
America, are so committed that no other 
form of government is now either pos- 
sible or consistent with the national 
habits and the historical development of 



DEMOCRACY 145 

the country. A republic flourishes in 
America because it is the form of gov- 
ernment best suited to the national hab- 
its and temper. In America a republic 
is as much the product of the natural 
and original conditions of the country as 
are its fauna and flora. A democratic 
republic is, in fact, the normal govern- 
ment of Americans. There is probably 
not a single American living who does 
not hope for the perpetuation of the es- 
tablished government. That no other 
form of government could at present 
flourish here is manifest. The prob- 
lem is, Will the conditions which have 
long favored democracy continue? Of 
all the dangers which beset a democratic 
republic, the greatest is the multitude 
of demagogues and petty politicians 
whom popular governments foster. If 
a radical change shall ever come about 
in American political institutions, — and 



146 AMEEICA AFTER THE WAR 

history proves that no one form of gov- 
ernment is perpetual, — it will doubtless 
be largely due to the abandoned charac- 
ter and the insincerity of the profes- 
sional political class. The experience of 
mankind teaches that under all forms 
of government the mass of the people is 
powerless to react against the general 
perversion of the political class of the 
country except by a revolution. 

A long period of suffering from cor- 
ruption and inefficiency of the estab- 
lished republican government in Amer- 
ica might bring about a change. If 
through deplorable necessity a change in 
the constitution of government shall 
ever become imperative in the long fu- 
ture of the American nation, it will 
doubtless be due to the incurable public 
corruption of the politicians and to the 
consequent breaking down of the execu- 
tive, legislative, and judicial institutions 



DEMOCRACY 147 

established by the Constitution. Their 
demonstrated incapacity to perform well 
the true functions of government might 
suddenly bring about a revolution and 
change. That there is at present any 
serious degeneration in American po- 
litical institutions impartial observers 
do not detect. The executive continues 
to be highly intelligent, disinterested, 
and efficient ; the legislative bodies, while 
not free from all reproach, are in the 
main fairly representative and seldom 
corrupt. The Federal judiciary re- 
mains above all just criticism or re- 
proach. That the various legislative 
bodies, the weak spots of the Govern- 
ment, will in course of time become even 
more truly representative of the more 
elevated thought and desires of good and 
conscientious Americans most of them 
continue to hope and trust. 

That there is a modern tendency to 



148 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

chicanery and what the French call 
chantage savant in American poli- 
tics some, perhaps not many, elevated 
Americans are at times forced to sus- 
pect. If this suspicion should ever ripen 
into a general conviction, it would be a 
sign of danger for democracy. The de- 
fects referred to are not, however, yet 
sufficiently grave to constitute a menace 
to existing institutions, but that they 
are sufficient to constitute a possible 
danger ahead is not to be ignored. That 
the problems of the American form 
of government are sufficiently grave to 
demand greater attention from the men 
in public life, all Americans out of pub- 
lic life believe. Before the defects of 
democracy are entirely eradicated, any 
attempt to impose American democracy 
as a system on foreign states may be pre- 
mature. 
A recent issue of an American journal, 



DEMOCRACY 149 

the organ of a religious faith embracing 
many millions of American citizens, 
contains a serious and a significant ref- 
erence to the democracy of the American 
politicians. This journal pertinently 
asks "whether the object of democratic 
governments is the happiness, welfare 
and progress of a nation, or the mere 
perpetuation of democratic institutions 
which systematically neglect any or all 
of these objects of government. ' ' It 
then proceeds to point out that democ- 
racy has been tried only by highly civil- 
ized and enlightened peoples with some 
measure of success. It admits that de- 
mocracy has proved up to the present to 
be the government best suited for Amer- 
ica, where, although lacking in efficiency, 
it has justified itself in results. The 
journal adds in substance: "Democ- 
racy has not yet been able to impose it- 
self on the world as a principle, for it is 



150 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

in the experimental stage. It has never 
yet succeeded with others than enlight- 
ened and fully civilized peoples." 
Without the obligation of accepting or 
denying the truth of this particular con- 
clusion of the journal in question, a re- 
flecting reader will at once admit to him- 
self that it is true that democracy is still 
on trial as a principle, and he will 
naturally conclude that any effort on the 
part of Americans of the present century 
to impose their own system, however ad- 
mirable for themselves, on other coun- 
tries is both premature and in direct con- 
flict with the leading principle of democ- 
racy itself. A consistent democracy 
leaves to the people of every country the 
right to form their own government, as 
the English foreign minister, Mr. Bal- 
four, very lately said, "according to 
their own ideas, and based on their own 
history, character, and hopes." 



DEMOCRACY 151 

The world has a very long history, and 
that American democracy is even yet in 
the experimental stage must be admitted 
by every reflecting man. Until recently 
American democracy has been conserva- 
tive and just. The older democracies 
were not exempt from serious defects. 
They were not fair to property, and 
therefore perished. Certain recent dem- 
ocratic theories of taxation, very much 
favored by the modern school of demo- 
crats, have not yet been worked out in 
America in detail. On the practical re- 
sults of the application of these theories 
the ultimate fate of democracy in Amer- 
ica much depends. If it shall be proved 
that the new theories stifle individual in- 
itiative, destroy property and energy, 
and are subversive of all the arts and 
the sciences peculiar to high civilization, 
it will be safe to affirm that either these 
unjust theories must be quickly aban- 



152 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

doned or else that democracy will not 
establish itself as a recognized principle 
for the world. If such fallacious the- 
ories of taxation are persisted in after 
being demonstrated unsound, it is safe 
to affirm that then it will be democracy 
which will be forced to give way to some 
other system of government productive 
of better results to mankind. A system 
of taxation is dangerous to the stability 
of government in exact proportion to its 
injustice. It must be remembered that 
liberty, freedom, and justice are not in- 
consistent with forms of government 
other than democracies. There have 
been democracies in the past which have 
subverted both liberty and justice. The 
great constitutional lawyer, Mr. Justice 
Story, thought that democracies could 
maintain themselves only where the 
people were superior and highly enlight- 
ened. His conclusion is entitled to some 



DEMOCRACY 153 

consideration by thoughtful men even in 
democracies, for he contributed much to- 
ward the success of the republic insti- 
tuted by the established democracy of 
America. 

Doubtless Americans are justified thus 
far in regarding their own political in- 
stitutions as the best for themselves, for 
no other form of government has ever 
produced for so long a period so much 
happiness among so many people in so 
great an extent of country. Neverthe- 
less, it is highly inexpedient for Ameri- 
can democracy to endeavor to force de- 
mocracy as a principle at this time on the 
other nations of the world. No mon- 
archical nation would be willing to ac- 
cept its political institutions from a for- 
eign power. Nor can a foreign country 
be forced even by a successful war to act 
against the national predilections, cus- 
toms, and traditions. Nothing so cer- 



154 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

tainly tends to the perpetuation of mon- 
archy in Europe at the present time as 
the proclamation of a democratic power 
that a particular monarchical country 
must accept democracy as a principle. 

It is to be feared that the American 
proclamation of democracy as a uni- 
versal principle of government is dis- 
quieting to those of our own allies whose 
regime is aristocratical, if not abso- 
lutely monarchical. It takes no note of 
the real strength of European aristocra- 
cies at the present time. Lord North- 
cliffe has evidently detected this danger, 
for he has announced that America is 
not now fighting for democracy (" Cur- 
rent Opinion Magazine" for October, 
1917). In Europe the aristocracies, 
while having undergone a great inherent 
change, still possess a commanding in- 
fluence in all European states. Some 
years since a distinguished French 



DEMOCRACY 155 

writer, Count Melchior de Vogiie, well 
pointed out the radical changes which 
had taken place in the modern constitu- 
tions of European aristocracies. 

Although aristocracies of any kind 
may be distasteful to Americans, they 
ought not to shut their eyes to the fact 
that the aristocratic classes are in Eu- 
rope still strongly intrenched and greatly 
respected by most Europeans. The 
aristocracies of Europe, however now 
constituted, are seriously attached to 
monarchical institutions, which they 
naturally associate with the ideals that 
they most cherish in life. In order to 
abolish monarchy in Europe it will be 
necessary to uproot the whole social or- 
der of all European states except Swit- 
zerland. An American propaganda for 
democracy outside of America is there- 
fore inexpedient, as it tends to shock and 
alienate the aristocratic classes in the 



156 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

various countries of the European allies 
of America. In Europe the aristocracy 
as a body is evidently beginning to won- 
der where the entente with America is 
leading them, and, if the truth were 
known, the American proclamation of 
democracy as a universal principle is be- 
coming a powerful influence in Europe 
for a speedy peace. Many Europeans, 
quite outside of Germany and Austria, 
begin to see that if the Hapsburgs and 
the Hohenzollerns are to be forcibly 
ejected from their hereditary kingdoms, 
the royal houses of Windsor, Savoy, 
Spain, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden 
will soon be expelled. Now, the govern- 
ing aristocracies of all these countries 
are by no means ready to abdicate, nor 
are their kings, whatever Mr. Lloyd 
George and his followers may have in 
contemplation for England's particular 
royalties. It is a formidable undertak- 



DEMOCRACY 157 

ing for America to attempt to establish 
a universal democracy on the debris of 
the last of the thrones of Europe. 

Nor can Americans afford to disre- 
gard the fact that even in republican 
France there still exists a powerful aris- 
tocratic class who, while ever loyal to 
France, never allow themselves in times 
of peace to come into personal contact 
with the officialdom of the republic. The 
old French aristocracy still believe, as 
Bismarck believed, that a republic is not 
the most formidable government in a 
military sense for France. They are 
convinced that republican politics lead 
to corruption and tend to weaken 
France. The old French aristocracy, 
in other words, do not believe in the 
principle of democracy. Americans 
should bear in mind that it is not abso- 
lutely impossible that in some circum- 
stances France may yet become a mon- 



158 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

archy and join some future league of the 
kings. It is quite significant that even 
the most advanced republican officials in 
France have had the moderation to rec- 
ognize that, so long as the existing dem- 
ocratic institutions of France are not 
threatened directly from without, the po- 
litical principles of foreign states should 
not be provoked by France even in time 
of war. Concerning the revolution in 
Russia, official France has been notably 
reticent. The action of America has 
been otherwise, and not in accordance 
with American precedent. A revolution 
in Russia is not necessarily a democratic 
manifestation. 

After the revolt of the Spanish prov- 
inces from Spain, the United States 
thought it decorous to wait five years 
before any formal recognition of their 
independence. Whether the future Gov- 
ernment of Russia, as it shall be ulti- 



DEMOCRACY 159 

mately reorganized, may not take excep- 
tion and umbrage to the speedy recogni- 
tion by America of the Revolution re- 
mains to be seen. The pendency of the 
Great War is the justification, doubtless, 
for the prompt American action toward 
the Russian Revolution. It would seem 
unfortunate that it was not possible for 
America to cooperate with the Russian 
military authorities in their offensive 
against Germany without the necessity 
of a recognition of the Revolution before 
some form of government that showed 
greater indications of permanency had 
been erected in Russia. It is apparent 
that the Republic of France has been 
more cautious in its attitude toward the 
Revolution in Russian, while the democ- 
racy of England has spoken with hesita- 
tion. The long holding back in London 
of the first American despatches from 
Washington to Russia would seem to in- 



160 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

dicate some doubt on the part of the 
English authorities about the wisdom of 
the speedy American indorsement of the 
Russian Revolution. 

So long as the principle of democracy 
in America is not questioned by Euro- 
peans, it is impolitic for America to chal- 
lenge the principle of monarchy in Eu- 
rope. If Europe becomes restless or re- 
sentful of American influence, monarchy 
as a principle will quickly reincorpo- 
rate itself with the aid of the powerful 
European aristocracy. It may then con- 
clude that its own favorite institutions 
cannot survive if menaced overtly by the 
American democracy. It is not impos- 
sible that in that event America will be 
plagued by a powerful European coali- 
tion endeavoring to undermine it in all 
directions. America has no proper con- 
cern with democracy as a principle of 
government except in so far as it relates 



DEMOCRACY 161 

to America. In America democracy has 
the right and the duty to maintain itself 
by every means in its power, but it is im- 
politic for America to project itself un- 
necessarily against the monarchical pre- 
dilections and traditions of Europeans. 
America cannot afford to occupy the po- 
sition of provocateur of European revo- 
lutions. It is a maxim that " revolu- 
tions often react and devour their 
nurses.' ' The freedom and security of 
Americans are too important to be jeop- 
arded by hostile and intrusive asser- 
tions of Americans that democracy is the 
only proper governmental principle. 

Wise Americans do not forget that 
democracy has ncft yet solved in America 
some of the peculiar problems of popu- 
lar government which require a longer 
period of time for their proper solution. 
The efficient government of great cities 
on the principle of democracy is only one 



162 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

of the many existing problems of de- 
mocracy. The comparatively new civic 
communities in America have not had 
time to create a civic spirit. It is 
thought that it takes 500 years to con- 
solidate and train any civic community. 
But, whatever the reason may be, thus 
far democracy has not solved in America 
the problem of the orderly and the eco- 
nomic government of great cities. Un- 
der no other form of government is the 
administration of great municipalities 
so bad and so extravagant as it is in 
America. Unjust and excessive munici- 
pal assessments and taxation, the ex- 
ploitation of the municipal resources by 
designing demagogues, a general waste- 
ful extravagance, and an ineffective po- 
lice are familiar spectacles in the larger 
American cities. These things threaten 
property and menace the prosperity of 
the whole country. Peaceable, old-fash- 



DEMOCRACY 163 

ioned citizens of districts adjacent to 
large cities in America have been ac- 
tually mined by the unjust exploitations 
of the municipal authorities. Their out- 
lying lands have been taken from them 
through unjust assessments fomented by 
civic political exploiters, and no ade- 
quate redress has as yet been discovered 
for this form of municipal injustice. 
Of all governments the municipal is 
that which touches most closely the wel- 
fare of the people, and it is most impor- 
tant to them that it should be good and 
efficient. 

Until the democratic municipal gov- 
ernments of America are made far bet- 
ter, as they doubtless will be and must 
be in the course of time, American 
democracy has no complete title to jus- 
tify itself as a general principle for the 
world. It is generally admitted that de- 
mocracy will be able to solve its munici- 



164 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

pal problems only after a much longer 
period of time. Meanwhile democracy 
in America will have problems enough of 
its own without undertaking to spread 
democracy as a principle throughout 
Europe. 

The inefficiency of democracy as a 
principle of government was lately em- 
phasized by the disclosure of the de- 
plorable situation of the shipping of the 
United States. At the outbreak of the 
present war in 1914 America, with a 
coast-line far greater than that of any 
country in Europe and with a large mari- 
time population once training and send- 
ing to sea the most skilful sailors in the 
world, had virtually no merchant ship- 
ping. Her coast people, who naturally 
follow the sea, had deserted it. Why 
this was puzzled thoughtful Americans. 
It has been suggested that there has long 
been a great shipping trust, representing 



DEMOCRACY 165 

all the large European companies, Eng- 
lish, French, and German alike. It is 
said that the shipping laws of America 
have been made in the interest of the for- 
eign shipping trusts and not in the inter- 
est of the American nation. It is evi- 
dent that this explanation ought not to 
be accepted without proof, for it may be 
an unjust reflection on Congress. That 
the destruction of American shipping is 
due to other causes than corruption in 
Congress is the better and more conserv- 
ative opinion. Unfortunately, that ex- 
planation reflects on the capacity for 
government of democracy. 

With all its defects, educated and in- 
fluential Americans of the best tradi- 
tional type believe that democracy is a 
necessary principle of free government 
in America. They continue to hope and 
believe that the manifest defects in the 
operation of the democratic political in- 



166 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

stitutions of America can and will be 
obviated in time. But the wisest of them 
are convinced that the principle of 
"America for the Americans" is endan- 
gered by any premature attempt of 
Americans to impose the principle of 
democracy at this time on the govern- 
ments of Europe as a world principle. 
America is making war against Ger- 
many not to extend democracy or the 
peculiar institutions of America, but, as 
Lord NorthclirTe has rightly conjectured, 
in order to defend American nationality 
and American freedom against the as- 
saults of a formidable and unscrupulous 
foreign enemy. That America will and 
must succeed in the war admits of no 
doubt ; but in order to succeed it is quite 
unnecessary for Americans to obscure 
the plain issue with Germany by the dis- 
cussion of a political philosophy not yet 
complete. 



DEMOCRACY 167 

The time is doubtless coming in the 
world when the security of a personal 
liberty will be a first principle of all 
governments, no matter what form they 
may assume. Tyrannies everywhere 
will pass away forever. Monarchies 
will be as liberal and as free as republics. 
A more intelligent and trained public 
will no longer in any country be deluded 
by mere oratorical phrases. Govern- 
ments of all kinds will be recognized as 
an intricate business, and they will be 
given over to the most capable, the most 
efficient, and the best trained. The 
United States will then form no excep- 
tion to a universal principle. It will be- 
come more practical and less idealistic. 
The demagogues and the visionaries in 
America will then be required by an in- 
telligent public to yield their influence 
to more capable men. Then only will 
liberty be well ordered and permanent 



16S AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

iu the world, and democracy triumph as 
a universal principle. When this comes 
about there will be no need of an Ameri- 
can crusade to impose the principles of 
democracy on the world. The world 
will then be safe for democracy and de- 
mocracy safe for the world. 

Since America has declared war 
against Germany the conduct of its de- 
mocracy has justified the expectations of 
the most ardent Americans. Democracy 
in the United States has thus far dis- 
played a loyalty and a quiet dignity ri- 
valing France. It has submitted to un- 
precedented and drastic military meas- 
ures of the Government without a mur- 
mur and with a readiness and loyalty not 
exceeded in the German Empire. With 
such a citizenship any Government may 
be well satisfied. This conduct of the 
American people points to a long reign 
of order under the republic. But the 



DEMOCRACY 169 

real test of democracy and republican 
institutions will come after the war, 
when the politicians begin again their 
mischievous appeals for total disarma- 
ment and for the neglect of our war de- 
fensive with the hope of capturing a dis- 
contented and impoverished people. If 
democracy passes through the ordeal 
safely, proves conservative, and con- 
tinues to exhibit an intelligent and ele- 
vated political outlook, discarding the 
coming socialistic program of the ex- 
treme political demagogues, the republic 
will be safe for a long, a conservative, 
and an interesting future. It will, how- 
ever, be compelled to correct that fatal 
defect of democracies — excessive gov- 
ernmental extravagance in the wrong di- 
rection. While America has been able 
to stand up in the past despite the gross 
extravagance of its governmental ma- 
chine, the time is coming when a non- 



170 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

productive extravagance in the wrong 
directions will have to cease if democ- 
racy is to prove permanent. If the at- 
titude of the American democracy 
proves as correct toward the notorious 
improvidence of the politicians at Wash- 
ington as it has thus far proved toward 
the pending war, democracy will have 
vindicated itself completely, and the re- 
public will be safe for a long time to 
come. 



CHAPTER XI 

AN AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE 

There can be no more imperative duty 
than that immediately after the pres- 
ent war the American Government shall, 
cost what it may, speedily revive its 
merchant marine. Once the acknowl- 
edged mistress of the seas, America is 
now bound hand and foot by the great 
foreign ship-owning powers of the world. 
It is thus rendered helpless in war, and 
placed in times of peace at unnecessary 
disadvantage. Even the Government 
mails and the private despatches are 
wholly at the mercy of foreigners, as 

America has no fast mail-ships of its 
171 



172 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

own. Almost every ton of freight pro- 
duced in America pays rich tolls to aliens 
and is covered in transit by strange flags. 
American merchants are thus placed by 
a government policy, as wrong as impol- 
itic, at the mercy of foreign ship-owners, 
while Americans citizens are humiliated 
by being forced to seek passage on for- 
eign vessels even when approaching or 
quitting their own shores. And yet 
America claims to be one of the richest 
and most advanced countries of the 
world. Why is it that its sea-borne com- 
merce is deliberately handed over to for- 
eigners, its defensive warfare allowed to 
be paralyzed, and its citizens driven 
from the gainful occupation of the seas ! 
A government policy which suffers these 
things is as incompetent as it is unwise. 
Until this particular wrong to American 
citizens is remedied, America cannot be 
reckoned among the great and formid- 



A MEECHANT MARINE 173 

able powers of the world. Any of the 
great foreign governments may at will 
interdict or impede American trade. 
This the American Government can pre- 
vent only by the reestablishment of its 
once prosperous merchant marine. 

In the early days of the republic the 
merchant marine and the foreign com- 
merce of America were sedulously and 
intelligently protected and fostered by 
the American Government. The deep- 
sea fisheries, those nurseries of the 
navy, were until 1866 encouraged by 
special bounties. The result of this pro- 
tection was that America gained the War 
of 1812 on the seas, although the victory 
was waived by the Treaty of Ghent, 
which in effect repealed the laws favor- 
able to the American merchant marine. 
Had it not been for the Federal statute 
of 1817, still in force, which closed coast- 
wise commerce to foreigners, America 



174 AMERICA AFTEE THE WAR 

to-day would have barely a ship left on 
the high seas. Between the years 1830 
and 1838 the American merchant marine 
somewhat flourished because American 
wooden ships could be built more cheaply 
and American mariners were acknowl- 
edged to be the most skilful afloat. But 
with the coming of steam power and iron 
and steel ships all this natural advantage 
was lost. In 1858, when it was proposed 
to remedy the condition, the Southern 
slave-owners began openly to play into 
the hands of the foreign shipmasters and 
to oppose any governmental encourage- 
ment necessary to enable American ship- 
masters to compete with the cheaper- 
manned and -built foreign ships. This 
Southern opposition is now thought by 
well-informed men to have been the first 
move of the Secessionist party in the 
United States. 
In President Cleveland's administra- 



A MERCHANT MARINE 175 

tion, to which the modern American 
Navy owes so much, it was made evident 
that something must be done to restore 
the American merchant marine. Ac- 
cordingly the act of 1845, authorizing the 
Federal Government to contract for car- 
rying the mails on American ships, was 
substantially reenacted in 1891 ; but 
unfortunately the act of 1891 did not 
offer sufficient encouragement to Ameri- 
can shipmasters. In 1912, foreign-built 
ships at last became entitled, after a long 
opposition, to American registry, but the 
higher American operating scale frus- 
trated also this law. The tariff bill of 
1913 was on sound principles. It gave a 
five per cent, discount of duties on mer- 
chandise imported in American bottoms ; 
but the act was rendered futile by the 
favored-nation clauses in all American 
treaties. It is intimated that Congress 
realized this when the law was enacted 



176 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

and that it was intended to be inopera- 
tive. 

When the present war broke out in 
1914 the shocking condition of the Amer- 
ican merchant marine was brought f orci- 
oly home to Americans. All the foreign 
commerce immediately retired from 
America, and America had virtually no 
ships of its own. It was then proposed 
by patriotic Americans to buy all the 
foreign ships in sight, but this "dollar 
project' ' was immediately frustrated by 
foreign nations as well as by princi- 
ples of the international laws of war. 
Withal, the war would have quickly re- 
vived shipbuilding and American ship- 
ping had it not been for the enactment of 
the "La Follette- Alexander Bill," one of 
the worst pieces of demagogic class legis- 
lation the world has ever beheld. This 
measure enabled American sailors to de- 
sert at will, while it prevented replacing 



A MERCHANT MARINE 177 

them with such sailors as are freely em- 
ployed by both English and French ship- 
masters. By the enactment of useless 
and unwise details the bill made the op- 
erating cost of American ships so ex- 
cessively dear that no freights whatever 
could be earned by American-owned ves- 
sels. The La Follette-Alexander Bill 
should have been entitled "a bill for 
driving American ships off the high 
seas." Passed on November 4, 1914, 
this iniquitous law has rapidly driven 
the remnant of American commerce off 
the seas. It handed over the Pacific 
commerce to Japan. A more wicked and 
a more unpatriotic measure than the La 
Follette-Alexander Bill has never been 
enacted by Congress. It is obvious that, 
unless this sort of legislation is soon put 
a stop to, Congress ought to give place 
to a more efficient kind of legislature. 
The Americans are a patient people, but 



178 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

they are impatient in the end when re- 
form is necessary. If necessary, they 
will reform Congress or any other gov- 
ernmental organ which stands persist- 
ently in the way of national progress. 
Possibly it cannot be said with accuracy 
that the neglect of the American mer- 
chant marine is the result of deliber- 
ate treachery to American institutions. 
That it is a manifestation of a certain 
sort of inept demagogy which often pro- 
duces in popular governments very bad 
results for the time being is, however, 
evident. 

To employ a euphemism, the worst has 
not been said concerning this " mistaken 
policy' ' of the American Congress. In 
time of war a great merchant marine is 
indispensable to many successful mili- 
tary operations. Without the aid of 
merchant shipping battles may be lost 



A MERCHANT MARINE 179 

and the country subjugated by a foreign 
power. 

The rapid transport of troops by sea is 
a military necessity. It can be accom- 
plished rapidly only by the employment 
of the national mercantile marine. To 
operate as an efficient auxiliary to the 
defense of the nation the merchant ma- 
rine must be kept always in a state of 
the highest efficiency; the gross tonnage 
must be large, and the individual ships 
speedy and roomy. Three gross tons is 
reckoned the minimum for the transpor- 
tation of a soldier and ten gross tons the 
minimum for a horse. In 1914^15 Ger- 
many had 5,090,331 gross tons of steel 
merchant shipping capable of landing at 
least 1,000,000 soldiers with adequate 
supplies on any enemy coast within a 
brief time. England was far better sup- 
plied with transport facilities, having 



180 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

nearly 21,000,000 gross tons. The con- 
dition of the United States was negligi- 
ble. It was not adequate to convey rap- 
idly by sea even the small army neces- 
sary for the defense of the Panama 
Canal or Cuba. A hostile occupation of 
Cuba by an enemy force might prove fa- 
tal to the United States, and, what is 
more, easy of accomplishment by a great 
European power at war with America. 
A merchant marine in time of war is 
essential for the collection of war ma- 
terial. America procures from Chile 
most of the sodium nitrate from which is 
made nitric acid, essential to the manu- 
facture of guncotton and smokeless pow- 
der. Perhaps a hundred highly desir- 
able articles for war material, not all of 
them indispensable, are derived from 
foreign countries, and can be conveyed 
in times of war only in domestic bottoms 
properly convoyed. In a hundred ways 



A MERCHANT MARINE 181 

a nation deprived of a mercantile marine 
by bad laws is placed at a great disad- 
vantage in times of war as in times of 
peace. 

In 1865 American deep-water tonnage 
carried seventy per cent, of its exports 
and sixty-five per cent, of its imports. 
But in 1914 almost all the exports and 
imports of America were carried by 
foreigners, who thrived with the profits 
paid to them by the American producers. 
Thus the millions of freight moneys 
which should have found their way into 
American banks were deposited in Lon- 
don and Berlin. 

After the war, if America would re- 
main at a high stage of national effi- 
ciency, the present laws affecting its mer- 
chant marine must be speedily altered. 
There is doubtless in America a popular 
disapproval of bounties and subsidies 
to American shipmasters. This spirit, 



182 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

correct in the abstract, is much per- 
verted and encouraged by demagogic pol- 
iticians, who prefer to waste the public 
moneys in grossly extravagant expendi- 
tures more directly profitable to them- 
selves or their constituents. A well-di- 
rected campaign of education may be 
necessary to prove to the people of the 
interior of America that a great mer- 
chant marine is essential to their protec- 
tion and to the prosperity of the whole 
nation. Americans . learn quickly, and 
they can be made to unlearn as quickly, if 
desired. When they come to perceive 
that the nation can be neither strong nor 
highly prosperous without a merchant 
marine, they will readily consent to all 
measures necessary for the upbuilding 
and the maintenance of American ship- 
ping. 

The merchant marines of all the great 
powers have been built and maintained 



A MERCHANT MARINE 183 

by bounties, favorable discounts, or sub- 
sides. The greater European govern- 
ments are most liberal to their ship-own- 
ers and to the national shipping inter- 
ests generally. This policy is not ani- 
mated by a desire to favor ship-owners, 
qua ship-owners, but to strengthen and 
fortify the whole nation. England has 
led the way in the development of Eng- 
lish shipping by liberal subventions or 
bounties to English ships built on certain 
lines and convertible into armed cruisers. 
The English Government has not hesi- 
tated to make large advances of the pub- 
lic funds to English companies engaged 
in the business of overseas transporta- 
tion. English postal subsidies to the 
fast English steamship lines are most 
liberal. In fact, the whole scheme of the 
law of England is designed to foster for- 
eign commerce in English-built ships. 
Germany, France, and Japan all subsi- 



184 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

dize in one way and another the ships un- 
der their flags. They recognize by their 
laws the fundamental importance of sea- 
borne commerce under the national flag. 
The time has come when America must 
do the same or grow weaker and weaker 
as a power. 

If American ship-builders are at a nat- 
ural disadvantage, it must be overcome 
by necessary legislation. If the cost of 
maintenance of American ships is 
greater by reason of the greater cost of 
labor, or because of the unjust demands 
of labor-unions, then the American Gov- 
ernment which tolerates such things 
must foot the bill in the interest of the 
whole nation and a determined national 
policy. Nothing will pay the nation bet- 
ter than large and liberal encouragement 
to American ship-builders and American 
ship-owners. Such a policy will in all 
probability result in the ultimate inde- 



A MERCHANT MARINE 185 

pendence of the ship industries of the 
country. In the end they will be made 
self-supporting, for shipmasters always 
fear to rely on the Government's con- 
tinuing liberality. They naturally seek 
to become independent and self-support- 
ing. 

Cost the nation what it may, there can 
be no better investment of the public 
funds than in the support and mainte- 
nance of the American mercantile ma- 
rine. When stately American ships 
cover every sea, when ocean greyhounds, 
American bred, carry Americans more 
swiftly and safely than the mail-boats of 
other nations; when the American flag 
floats proudly in every foreign port, 
then, and not until then, will America 
be a supremely great power. May that 
day speedily come! 



CHAPTER XII 

PREPAREDNESS 

The worst foes of a long era of peace 
for the world are the idealists known as 
extreme pacifists and the socialistic 
dreamers. These fantastic thinkers for- 
get that man is a dominating and a fight- 
ing being. In peace man struggles for 
mastery and success in human society; 
his victories in peace are the results of 
the lesser forces skilfully employed in a 
warfare of a social variety. Collec- 
tively, men love warfare more than 
peace. The will to dominate, which can- 
not be eradicated from human nature, 
impels men, combined in nations, to the 
use of the major forces whenever they 

186 



PREPAREDNESS 187 

are necessary to attain national domina- 
tion. The weapons employed in national 
force are called " armaments.' ' If na- 
tions were to disarm by agreement, they 
would soon improvise the more primi- 
tive weapons necessary to enable them to 
carry out their new schemes of national 
domination. Battles might for a time be 
less scientific, but human ingenuity 
would make them hardly less sanguinary 
or less savage. It is idle to think that 
wars would be avoided because of na- 
tional disarmaments. New and cheaper 
arms hastily improvised would be sub- 
stituted for the abandoned armaments, 
but wars would not cease, and will never 
cease, while mankind remain masterful 
and contending beings. If nations were 
disarmed, the numerically weak nation 
would be placed at a greater disadvan- 
tage. The nations of millions would 
soon overcome and depress the nations 



188 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

of thousands by the very force of num- 
bers. Disarmament, to be effectual, 
would require the redistribution of coun- 
tries into districts of equal content. 

The men termed ' ' pacifists ' ' are of two 
varieties: those who would promote 
peace by sensible endeavor, and those 
who believe that wars may be eradicated 
by some scheme of universal disarma- 
ment or the total neglect of military ed- 
ucation. The second kind of pacifists 
are called "extreme pacifists' ' because 
they believe that every warlike prepara- 
tion is a moral offense. Extreme paci- 
fists, in the very face of danger to their 
country, would consent to render it an 
easy prey for the enemy. Of all dan- 
gers to the state the extreme pacifists 
are the greatest. Every cultivated or 
thoughtful man is in some degree a paci- 
fist. He loves peace and he believes in 
the substitution of arbitration for force 



PREPAREDNESS 189 

in the greatest possible number of inter- 
national differences. But he recognizes 
that some national differences can be 
solved in only one way, and that way is 
by the employment of the national force 
in war. There have been wars from the 
very morning of history, and there will 
be wars until the night sets in for all 
mankind. There is not in Europe or in 
Asia a single eminent statesman who be- 
lieves for one instant that warfare will 
ever be a thing of the past. 

Preparedness has to do with the na- 
tional necessity called war. If a nation 
is right-minded, and there are nations 
which are not so, the extremity of war 
will be avoided whenever possible. But 
whenever a war is inevitable, a right- 
minded nation will be prepared to meet 
it, and that kind of nation will survive in 
the struggle for human existence. If a 
nation neglects preparation for war, and 



190 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

leaves itself exposed to every hostile ag- 
gression, that nation will be extermi- 
nated pursuant to the law which dooms 
all weaker beings in the struggle for ex- 
istence. A nation which neglects pre- 
paredness is a weak or a decadent na- 
tion ; it is a nation which lacks sense of 
proportion, one where the pursuit of 
wrong ideals has dulled the national in- 
telligence. It is a nation which has de- 
cided to neglect its progeny and its fu- 
ture. Deliberately such a nation has 
chosen to be trampled on in the end by 
the more aggressive and the more endur- 
ing types of men and nations. America 
is not such a nation. It will end in being 
prepared for all eventualities. That is 
preparedness. 

The first requisite for national pre- 
paredness, in view of the complicated, 
costly, and scientific military apparatus 
now employed in warfare, is a highly ef- 



PREPAREDNESS 191 

ficient civil government. The main effi- 
cient in modern warfare is a treasury 
balance on the right side, a prosperous 
national agriculture, and a rich and prof- 
itable national commerce. In a strong 
government all the national industries 
and organizations are sustained and 
made successful by judicious and highly 
scientific measures. Nothing good in 
the state is allowed to fall down. The 
education, the morale, the health, and the 
prosperity of the people of the na- 
tion are at all times maintained by gov- 
ernmental regulations at the highest 
stages of national efficiency. This de- 
sirable condition can be brought about 
only by a government conducted on the 
highest possible plane. Good govern- 
ment is essential to a strong and power- 
ful nation and to preparedness. 

Preparedness for America takes into 
consideration the extent of the territory 



192 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

to be defended. America has four mili- 
tary fronts open to enemy attack. The 
Pacific coast-line is exposed to attack 
by any great Asiatic power. The Atlan- 
tic coast is exposed to the hostile actions 
of any European power at war with the 
United States. Mexico and Canada, 
both weak countries, are not able to de- 
fend their neutrality, and the territories 
of either or both may be readily used as a 
base by any great power or combination 
of powers at war with the United States. 
Future wars will probably be conducted 
by groups of powers allied for the time 
being. An attack on America may be 
simultaneously made on all its fronts. 
Preparedness for America, therefore, 
presents the problem how best to defend 
the country against hostile attacks from 
any or all directions. Preparedness in 
America is not an aggressive, but a de- 
fensive, policy for a naturally peaceful 



PREPAREDNESS 193 

and rich country living under a lax and 
decentralized government in times of 
peace. In times of war American Gov- 
ernment, like the Roman, becomes more 
highly centralized, indeed a virtual dic- 
tatorship of an extremely powerful kind. 
The difficulty in America is that the con- 
version from one form of government 
adapted to peace to the other form more 
adapted for war takes time. In modern 
warfare there is little time given for 
preparedness. Consequently, if Amer- 
ica wishes to continue as it is, it must 
live under a regime of preparedness. 
Most sensible men who love peace and 
security support a national scheme for 
minimum preparedness. 

If Canada and Mexico were by proper 
and friendly treaties committed to some 
general alliance by which the whole of 
North America was obligated to resist 
hostile aggressions from across the seas, 



194 AMEEICA AFTER THE WAR 

the problem of preparedness would for 
the United States be much simplified. 
America would then be virtually an in- 
sular country. The first line of defense 
would be exclusively on the high seas, 
and this line could be held for a long time 
by a powerful and efficient navy. For 
the purposes of the exterior line of de- 
fense America should possess in the 
Pacific a modern fleet equal to that of the 
greatest Asiatic power. In the Atlan- 
tic, America should maintain a fleet 
equal to that of the greatest European 
power. With a coast-line of 6000 miles 
to guard, a little navy is of no use to the 
country. It would be better for Amer- 
ica to abolish the naval service alto- 
gether than to trust its defense to a small 
navy. A navy of the size here suggested 
would be an adequate protection for a 
great and a rich country and enable it to 



PREPAREDNESS 195 

meet the attacks which are sure to come 
in the future of the nation. 

The second line of defense for the 
proper security of America consists of 
the modern fortifications and military 
protective works necessary to guard the 
harbors and landing-places available for 
an enemy. To guard the second line the 
strongest possible modern fortresses 
should exist not at some points of the 
coast, but at all necessary points. Kept 
fully equipped with ordnance of the 
greatest power and range and with all 
the most advanced auxiliaries of modern 
defense, the second line of defense would 
be a protection to the country of the most 
efficient kind which it is overt treason in 
the military and the congressional au- 
thorities to neglect. The supplements to 
this second line of defense, the routes of 
quick communications, have not yet re- 



196 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

ceived all the attention their great im- 
portance demands of the authorities. 
There is now no system of strategical 
railways in America. But this defect 
can be readily overcome. The third line 
of defense is the army. The character 
and quality of this branch of the national 
defense is the supreme military problem. 
The United States will soon have to 
protect over two hundred millions of 
prosperous and peaceful citizens. It is 
thought by the best military authority 
that a standing army, for the effective 
defensive purposes of such a vast popu- 
lation, should consist of at least half a 
million men. This would be only one 
fourth of one per cent, of the population. 
Two hundred thousand soldiers would 
be required in the West and as many 
more in the East. One hundred thou- 
sand would be held in a central position, 
where they could easily be mobilized 



PREPAREDNESS 197 

either on the Southern or the Northern 
borders as the need developed. Such a 
regular army, if highly trained and disci- 
plined in the most modern and scientific 
methods, would be the nucleus of the 
greater army of national defense. Un- 
der-disciplined, carelessly trained, or ob- 
soletely armed and equipped, a regular 
army of even 500,000 would be worse 
than useless to the nation. An efficient 
modern army requires not only the most 
modern equipment, but an abundance of 
trained officers possessed of the best at- 
tainable military education. The Mili- 
tary Academy and the war colleges in 
America must therefore be kept superior 
to the best foreign standards. That 
they are so now many traveled Ameri- 
cans very much doubt; there are too 
many signs to the contrary. 

It is generally assumed that a standing 
army has not been popular in America. 



198 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

Certainly many American politicians of 
the easy-going, every-day variety have 
been opposed to a standing army, 
and the demagogues among them have 
long proclaimed that a standing army is 
a menace to liberty. But all Americans 
are not of the politician kind. Some of 
them are beginning to be convinced that 
in such a vast country, so rich and so 
largely populated, a regular army has 
become necessary for defense. A regu- 
lar American Army, as most intelligent 
men believe, would have little power to 
harm liberty. Many civilians are now 
convinced that the power for good of a 
regular army would more than compen- 
sate for any risk it entails. A regular 
army would not bring about a perpetual 
dictatorship a day sooner. America 
will not submit to a dictatorship until 
the country has become so fallen and so 
utterly wretched as to be able to be saved 



PREPAREDNESS 199 

from disorder in no other way. When 
America has fallen into that degraded 
condition, no regular army will be nec- 
essary to bring about a dictatorship. 
When the time is ripe, a dictatorship will 
come about in America by acclamation, 
just as it came about in ancient Rome. 
In all probability the American Republic 
will not for centuries fall through the 
rise of a dictator or through the machin- 
ations of ambitious men. If it falls, it 
will be through a conquest by stronger 
powers. 

It is thought by skilled military men 
to be possible for a combination of pow- 
ers at war with America to land in North 
America in a comparatively brief space 
of time a million trained soldiers, prop- 
erly equipped. There are now at least 
eight of the great powers each of which 
has an army of far more than two and 
a half million men. To cope with half 



200 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

this number speedily, a regular army of 
500,000 men, scattered throughout the 
United States, is conceded by experts to 
be wholly inadequate. A large part of 
the regulars would be required at the 
principal military stations throughout 
so vast a country. The regular army in 
America must therefore be largely sup- 
plemented by a national army quickly 
mobilized for the purpose of defense. A 
national army should be composed in the 
last extremity of all the men of military 
age. Probably there would never be an 
occasion when all would be called into 
the field. 

The old militia system is obsolete and 
useless for defense. The testimony of 
the leading military authorities in Amer- 
ica, from Washington down, is, in sub- 
stance, that a militia is not an effective 
military arm of the nation. Since 
Washington complained of the militia it 



PREPAREDNESS 201 

has become, under modern conditions, 
even less effective. However well dis- 
posed and patriotic the militia may be, it 
requires immediate reorganization in 
every war. It is always reorganized as 
a national army. Consequently, it has 
become the general opinion in the coun- 
try that the old militia system is obso- 
lete and that it must give way to univer- 
sal military service, preferably on the 
Swiss plan. The Swiss or the Austra- 
lian plan seems to be the most demo- 
cratic and the least expensive plan for 
the national army of a republic. The 
time it requires for training is short; it 
interferes little with the ordinary pur- 
suits of the young men of the nation, 
while its cost to the republic is compara- 
tively small. 

The Swiss system gives to every male 
under age, as a part of his general edu- 
cation, a compulsory military training of 



202 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

about one year. Thereafter the only ad- 
ditional military training necessary is 
about sixty-five days for the infantry, 
seventy-five for field artillery, and ninety 
days for the cavalry. The subsequent 
trainings, known as "repetition 
courses/ ' are confined to eleven days 
annually. After their twenty-third year 
the young men are placed in the reserve. 
The reserve is called upon only in cases 
of dire necessity. The Swiss system, if 
adopted in the United States as in Aus- 
tralia, would have the merit of not seri- 
ously interfering with the civil life and 
industries of the country, while it would 
create a national army of millions of 
men, trained, disciplined, and effective 
for all purposes of defense. Together 
with the regular army and navy, this sys- 
tem would render the country invulner- 
able to attack, and thus tend to make it 
immune from hostile aggression. 



PREPAREDNESS 203 

The unfortunate tendency in America 
has been toward a general indisposition 
to undergo military hardships of any 
kind. The inclination of the young men 
in particular is to seek the softer, the 
slouching, and the indifferent phases of 
life. This tendency would be overcome 
if the Swiss system were adopted. In- 
tensive military training promotes the 
general health, discipline, and order in 
ways most valuable for the country at 
large. A hardy body of young men, 
drilled, disciplined, and obedient to au- 
thority, would invigorate the whole coun- 
try and stimulate the desired public or- 
der in all directions. Besides, universal 
military training would create a patri- 
otic spirit and a love of country, without 
which no country can be in a healthy or 
a sound condition. Unless in such a con- 
dition, a nation is not prepared to meet 
all the vicissitudes of national existence, 



204 AMEEICA AFTER THE WAR 

and it ultimately would fall down before 
stronger and better-prepared nations. 

If the United States were to adopt the 
Swiss system, a great national auxiliary 
army of the highest efficiency for all pur- 
poses would at once spring into being. 
Universal military service is thoroughly 
democratic and consistent with modern 
pressure. Modern military movements 
are so speedy that there is now no time 
given to create an army. An army must 
in modern times be in existence and able 
to be mobilized, thoroughly armed and 
equipped within a few days. Every man 
enrolled in the general army should al- 
ways know his station in the event that 
the general army is quickly mobilized. 
Mobilization requires that the arms and 
equipment of the army shall always be 
ready. The greatest test of the military 
efficiency of a nation is the speed with 
which mobilization may be effected. 



PREPAREDNESS 205 

In order to mobilize speedily, every- 
thing must be ready. Modern guns and 
military material have become so elabo- 
rate and scientific that they cannot be 
improvised within a moderate space of 
time. They must be always on hand. 
Nothing can now be left to the future or 
chance. The general staff should there- 
fore always know that all the necessary 
military equipment and appliances for 
the army and navy are ready to meet an 
attack from any quarter. The expense 
to the nation of being ready is small 
compared with the cost to a rich nation 
caught unprepared. Improvidence and 
lack of military preparation have cost 
the United States far more in the ag- 
gregate than the largest standing army 
has cost the most warlike nation in 
Europe. 

The cost of maintaining a proper and 
efficient military establishment in the 



206 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

United States in time of peace would be 
far less than the cost of a hurried and 
nervous preparation on the eve of a 
great war. Statistics show that the cost 
of the past wars conducted by the United 
States under the old plan of voluntary 
enlistment and improvised preparation 
for war has been the greatest of all mod- 
ern wars. Indeed, the expenditures for 
military purposes in the United States 
have in recent years been almost as great 
as those of the most efficient military 
powers in Europe. In the United States 
only has the vast expenditure for mili- 
tary purposes been wasted and useless. 
From the present outlook it would ap- 
pear that Americans have now deter- 
mined to substitute an intelligent scheme 
of defense for the past wasteful extrava- 
gance amounting to national debauch. 
How best to accomplish it is the problem 
of preparedness. 



PREPAREDNESS 207 

All the former national wars of Amer- 
ica have been conducted in circum- 
stances more favorable than will occur 
again. The adversaries have been either 
weak nations or the terrain has been 
of America's own choice. Conditions 
have greatly changed. In the employ- 
ment of the old rifle or musket American 
farmers and frontiersmen of the last 
century needed little training to make 
them efficient; they were accustomed to 
the use of these arms. With the disap- 
pearance of large game and the old fron- 
tier life, all this former advantage has 
been lost. In the use of modern weap- 
ons of defense no other nation is now 
more unskilled than the American. In 
modern warfare neither arms nor their 
proper employment can be suddenly im- 
provised. Their production and their 
skilful use require a long period of 
preparation in times of peace. 



208 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 

Unless America arouses itself to the 
necessity of preparedness as a policy, 
it is doomed sooner or later to destruc- 
tion as a great power. There are ele- 
ments of dissolution within every organ- 
ism; there are also foes external as well 
as foes internal. Preparedness would 
postpone the natural operation of these 
forces for centuries, perhaps. Of all 
the enemies of a great nation the worst 
are the dreamers who see ahead an era 
of universal and perpetual peace. As 
man is constituted, perpetual peace is 
impossible. The life of nations, like the 
life of man, is one long struggle. Only 
that nation will survive which is strong 
in all directions. 



THE END 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper proces 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: j\^ 20C 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATK 

111 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 

(724)779-2111 



